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HANOCH DAGAN* & JAMES J. WHITE**
In this Article, Professors Hanoch Dagan and James White study the most recent
challenge raised by mass torts litigation: the interference of governments with the
bilateral relationship between citizens and injurious industries. Using the tobacco
settlement as their case study, Dagan and White explore the important benefits and
the grave dangers of recognizing governments' entitlement to reimbursement for
costs they have incurred in preventing or ameliorating their citizens' injuries. They
further demonstrate that the current law can help capture these benefits and guard
against the entailing risks, showing how subrogation law can serve as the legal
foundation of the governments' claims, and how takings law can be used as a check
against governmental abuse.
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INTRODUCTION
Citizens sue industries for tort injuries. That is familiar. Govern-
ments sue the same industries for costs suffered in ameliorating or
preventing those injuries. That is unfamiliar. This new pattern of liti-
gation and settlement inherently puts the government in competition
with its citizens. It also facilitates the government's fulfillment of its
public responsibility. This Article deals with these vices and virtues.
The tobacco litigation by the states and the settlement of that liti-
gation (the largest ever) is the most prominent example of this pattern
of government suing injurious industries. A similar pattern is devel-
oping in the gun industry where more than twenty suits have been
brought against the manufacturers.' Industries waiting in the vngs
for this treatment include lead paint makers,2 and perhaps even brew-
ers, distillers, and producers of fatty foods.3
1 See Paul M. Barrett & Mo Geyelin, Big National Law Firms Leap to Help Gun
Industry as It Fights Suits by Cities, Wall St. J., July 14, 1999, at B7.
2 See Saundra Torry, Lead Paint Could Be Next Big Legal Target, Wash. Post, June 10,
1999, at Al. Actually, Rhode Island has just begun litigation against lead paint manufac-
turers. See Judyth Pendell, Trial Lawyers' Next Target: The Paint Industry, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 18, 1999, at A49.
3 Similar triangulars occur not only in the setting of injurious industries, but also in the
context of international human rights cases. For example, in July 1995, the South African
Parliament passed an act giving members of the apartheid government amnesty against
civil claims. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, Act 34,
§20(7). The Azanian Peoples Organization, a largely black anti-apartheid group, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Act, claiming that their constitutional rights vwere vio-
lated because they could not seek reparations for their injuries through legal action. See
Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South Africa,
1996 (4) SALR 671, 672 (CC). The South African Constitutional Court held that the pro-
visions did violate part of the constitution, but ultimately justified their validity on the basis
of the constitution's epilogue, which allowed programs geared toward national unity and
reconciliation. See id. at 682-83. However, the court refused to find that the South African
government did not owe any duty to compensate the victims of apartheid and their families
for injuries and losses suffered, although the court indicated that full compensation was not
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always necessary, and that in some cases, "symbolic" compensation (such as erecting a
gravestone for a family's lost relative) would be sufficient. See id. at 695-96:
The resources of the State have to be deployed imaginatively, wisely, effi-
ciently and equitably to facilitate the reconstruction process.... [However,] it
is much too simplistic to say that the objectives of the Constitution could only
properly be achieved by saddling the State with the formal liability to pay, in
full, the provable delictual claims of those who have suffered patrimonial loss
The practical effect of this decision has been to decrease plaintiffs' awards. See Jeremy
Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa's Bill of
Rights and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 176, 201-02
(1998); see also Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice:
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. Toronto L.J. 355, 369
(1999).
Another litigation triangle occurred in India in the wake of the December 2, 1984
Bhopal chemical plant disaster. The accident caused nearly 2000 deaths and 200,000 inju-
ries when deadly gas escaped from a Union Carbide plant near Bhopal, India. See Jamie
Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons from Bhopal 3-5 (1993) (discussing de-
tails of the disaster). In an attempt to consolidate the claims, the Indian government en-
acted legislation. See C.I.S. Part IIA (1985), The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of
Claims) Act, New Delhi, 29 Mar. 1985. The Act empowered the government to be the
exclusive agent of the claims of all of Union Carbide's victims. See id. § 3. Because the
government of India was also named as a defendant in the suit for negligently monitoring
the industry, this legislation had the effect of putting the Indian government on both sides
of the litigation. Several commentators on the Bhopal litigation conclude that this arrange-
ment produced rather harmful results for the actual victims of the disaster. See, e.g.,
Cassels, supra, at 222-28.
After the litigation had been in play for several years, the Supreme Court of India
suddenly acquiesced to a settlement that had been secretly negotiated between Union Car-
bide and the government of India that required Union Carbide to pay $470 million in
damages. See id. at 222-23. Given the enormity of the catastrophe, the settlement was a
clear victory for Union Carbide. See id. Despite vociferous protestations from the acci-
dent victims as well as the international news media, the Indian government accepted the
settlement enthusiastically on behalf of the injured victims. See id. at 222-28. Meanwhile,
on average, families of those who had died in the accident received only $14,500 each,
those with permanent disabling injuries received approximately $4500 each, and those who
had not been permanently injured were awarded about $3125 each. See id. at 229.
A similar arrangement arose in Israel following a 1952 agreement between Israel and
Germany. In consideration for the money paid by Germany to Israel as reparation for the
material damages caused by the Nazis to the Jewish people, Israel agreed that Holocaust
survivors who were naturalized in Israel prior to October 31, 1953 would not be entitled to
sue Germany for health-related damages. See H.C. 5263/94 Hirschenzon v. Minister of
Finance, 49(5) P.D. 837. Before the constitutionalization of the right to property, the Is-
raeli Supreme Court sent complaints to the legislature. See id. at 841. But recently, after
such constitutionalization, see Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391,
the Court agreed to take a more active stance. In Hirschenzon, Holocaust survivors chal-
lenged the Minister of Finance's refusal to separate their annuities from the annuities given
to other groups of physically challenged people (such as soldiers injured in combat). See
Hirschenzon, 49(5) P.D. at 842. A majority of the Israeli Supreme Court held that this
refusal was illegal, and that while setting their annuity, the Minister of Finance must take
into account the State's deprivation of the Holocaust survivors' claims against Germany.
See id. at 844-45, 847-48. The minority went even further, saying that these Holocaust
survivors have an a priori valid takings claim, and raising further doubts as to the validity
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In this Article we address some of the questions raised by this
recent pattern of litigation and settlement. We assume throughout
that consumers or third parties have actually been harmed by the
products at issue, be it cigarettes, guns, etc., and have valid claims
against the pertinent industry.4 We explore the intricate legal ques-
tions arising from the triangular relationship among the players in
these high-profile cases: governments, citizens, and defendant indus-
tries. We have two major purposes: identifying the proper cause of
action of governments against industries and setting their appropriate
boundaries; and discussing the inherent risks in allowing such claims
and pointing to the way they should be addressed.
We take the triangle of states, smokers, and the tobacco industry
as our case study. Part I of this Article traces the tobacco saga, which
gives us a rich context of litigation and settlement that vividly demon-
strates the questions we address in this Article. This Part concludes
that some of the quid pro quo given by the states to the tobacco man-
ufacturers is actually at the expense of third parties: competitors (and
hence future consumers) and injured smokers.
Part II discusses the general question of the liability of an injuri-
ous industry to a government which has incurred preventative and
ameliorative costs due to the harms inflicted by that industry on its
citizens. We do not cover the whole range of causes of action that
were raised by the states in their suits against the tobacco companies,
which were by and large rejected (justifiably, in our view) by the
courts 5 Instead, we focus solely on the restitutionary claim of subro-
gation. Although subrogation was not adequately presented by the
states, it is their only valid claim. Part II explains why subrogation
of the statutory arrangement limiting their entitlement to the said annuity. See id. at 846-
47.
As the tobacco settlement is now making clear, these litigation triangles can result in
suits by the injured against the governments seeking individual restitution. See Stephen
Labaton, Medicaid Smokers Seek to Gain a Share of States' Settlement, N.Y. Tumes, Jan.
26, 2000, at All (discussing pending lawsuits that seek to capture any settlement funds
over what state Medicaid programs paid to treat smokers for Medicaid recipients who suf-
fered from smoking-related illnesses).
4 This is, to be sure, a debatable matter, on which we disagree between ourselves. For
conflicting views respecting the liability of the tobacco industry to smokers, compare Jon
D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L. 1163, 1175-76 (1998) (recommending compensa-
tion to smokers as way to regulate tobacco industry), with NV. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Mak-
ing the Risky Decision 151 (1992) (arguing for increased efforts to inform consumers of
risks of smoking). Professor Dagan subscribes to the former view, while Professor White
prefers the latter. Our interest in this Article, however, is strictly limited to the questions
that arise if we assume the industry's liability to the citizens.
5 See infra note 90.
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should be available to governments against industries, but also sets the
conditions and limitations of this restitutionary claim.
6
Part III takes up in detail the serious legal challenges of injured
citizens (smokers in our case study) that may arise regarding the legal-
ity of possible settlement provisions between governments and defen-
dant industries. The issues raised in Part III epitomize some of the
dangers of allowing governments to sue injurious industries for their
preventative and ameliorative costs and thus emphasize the limits of
the legitimate cause of action identified in Part II. These dangers are
also considered in Part IV, which addresses some broader public pol-
icy concerns.
I
THE TOBACCO CASE STUDY
Along with the fifteenth-century discovery of the New World
came the discovery of tobacco and its use by Europeans.7 Not far
behind this earliest use came the belief that smoking tobacco was bad
for one's health8 and the suspicion that it was addictive. 9 In the last
forty years these concerns have been confirmed by epidemiological
studies that now show, even to the satisfaction of the tobacco
manufacturers, 10 that smoking tobacco causes illnesses including
6 But cf. Doug Rendeman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Set-
tlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 Ga. L. Rev. 847, 899, 930 (1999) (conclud-
ing that law of restitution does not provide valid cause of action against tobacco
companies, assuming-contrary to our assumption-that tobacco companies are not liable
to smokers for damages).
7 See William Everett Bailey, The Invisible Drug 5 (1996) (discussing distribution of
tobacco by Spanish and Portuguese sailors in 1500s). Also recall the monologue by Bob
Newhart in which he reports Sir Walter Raleigh's discovery of tobacco's use in the colo-
nies. In his imaginary conversation with a representative in London, we hear the London
side of the phone call: "They wrap it in paper and put it in their mouths?" "They do what,
Walt?" (Incredulously) "They light it?"
8 See Stanton A. Glantz et al., The Cigarette Papers 1 (1996) (discussing first report of
tobacco's ill effects in 1665); Richard Kluger, Ashes to Ashes 15-16 (1996) (discussing be-
ginnings of concern for tobacco's ill effects on health).
9 See Bernard Lewis, The Middle East 161 (1995) (quoting Turkish historian, Ibrahim
Pechevi, writing circa 1635):
The fetid and nauseating smoke of tobacco was brought in the year 1009 [1600-
01 CE] by English infidels, who sold it as a remedy for certain diseases of
humidity. Some... pleasure-seekers and sensualists... became addicted, and
soon even those who were not pleasure-seekers began to use it, Many even of
the great ulema and the mighty fell into this addiction.
10 See Saundra Torry & John Schwartz, Contrite Tobacco Executives Admit Health
Risks Before Congress, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1998, at A14 (discussing tobacco executives'
admissions to Congress that smoking is hazardous); see also Suein L. Hwang, Tobacco
Firm Gives Frank Advice Online, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1999, at BI (noting that Brown &
Williamson's website acknowledges that "[t]he evidence is sufficient to determine that
smoking causes disease").
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cancer,1 ' heart disease, and emphysema. 12
Because injuries from tobacco were so insidious, making it easy
to believe that use in moderation was not deadly, most Americans
embraced tobacco use prior to 1960. For a time in twentieth-century
America, cigarettes were chic; smoking in American movies was por-
trayed in a favorable light well beyond World War II.13 Formal re-
strictions on smoking and social taboos against it (particularly against
women smoking) declined between 1920 and 1960.24 Even during this
time, however, public attitudes were not uniformly positive toward to-
bacco. One person's "chic" was another's "stinking weed." Even
smokers referred to cigarettes pejoratively as "coffin nails" or "cancer
sticks," and many parents who smoked discouraged their children
from smoking. In the latter half of this century, however, public intol-
erance toward smokers has sharply increased. Despite increasing an-
tagonism, almost no one thought there was a possibility that tobacco
manufacturers might have tort liability for a legal product,15 a belief
formally enshrined in Professor Prosser's comment to section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "Good tobacco is not unreasona-
bly dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be
harmful."' 6
11 In 1964, Surgeon General Luther L Terry released the fist official U.S. recognition
that smoking causes cancer. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Smoking and
Health (1964); see also Mortality Trends for Selected Smoking-Related Cancers and Breast
Cancer-United States, 1950-1990, 42 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 857 (1993)
(describing mortality trends for cancers at least 70% attributable to smoking and other
tobacco use).
12 See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Reducing the Health Consequences of
Smoking: 25 Years of Progress. A Report of the Surgeon General (1989).
13 See Bailey, supra note 7, at 38-40.
14 One of us can remember the signs in cracked and peeling paint on the doors of
Hutchins Hall at the Law School in Ann Arbor that prohibited bringing "lighted tobacco"
into the building in 1959. Smoking was then so common in and out of Hutchins Hall that
the signs had the quaint appearance of an ancient and abandoned prohibition.
15 Only a gifted few foresaw cigarettes' fate. In a 1984 article entitled "End of the
Trail," Garrison Keillor portrays the last days of America's remaining smokers. Shortly
after "adoption of the Twenty-eighth amendment," one of the last known smokers writes
to her children on the inside of a cigarette pack while hiding out:
Down to 1 cart. PIMls. Not my fav. Down to 1 cg/day. After supper. Hate to
say it but it tastes fant. So rich, so mild. I know you never approvd. Sorry. In
the 50s it was diffrnt, we all smokd. Felt like movies. So graceil, tak'g cg from
pk, the mtch, the lite, one smooth move. Food, sex, then smoke. Lng drags.
Lrnd Fr. exh. Then sudd. it was 82 and signs apprd (1rhanx for Not S). In my
home! Kids naggng like fishwives & yr dad sudd. went out for track. I felt
ambushed. Bob Dylan smokd, Carson, Beatles. I mean WE'RE NOT
CRIMINALS. Sorry. Too late now. More soon. Love, Mother.
Garrison Keillor, End of the Trail, New Yorker, Sept. 17, 1984, at 45.
16 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. i (1965) (addressing strict liability for
defective product).
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This Part provides a brief narrative of the tobacco litigation,
describing what events caused the shift in the tobacco companies' pre-
vious immunity from liability for injuries relating to tobacco use. We
then describe the history of the tobacco companies' settlement with
the state attorneys general. We attempt to explain why the tobacco
companies agreed to such large payments, particularly in the absence
of any explicit settlement provisions that would have protected the
companies from bankruptcy.
A. The Tobacco Litigation17
Until the 1990s, no smoker had recovered successfully against the
tobacco companies. Starting in the mid-1950s, individual plaintiffs
brought a series of cases, sometimes in tort but more often for viola-
tions of the warranty of merchantability. 18 Litigation then subsided
until the 1980s. In 1984, a plaintiff won the first jury verdict against a
tobacco company in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.19 The Cipollone
verdict was eventually overturned on appeal,2 0 however, and other
cases had equally unsatisfactory outcomes for plaintiffs.21
Although there were several more jury verdicts for plaintiffs in
the mid-1990s, 22 most individual plaintiffs continued to have a difficult
time either defeating tobacco companies at trial or having their ver-
dicts upheld on appeal.23 In 1999, for example, the tobacco manufac-
17 This narrative is highly condensed. For a more exhaustive history, see After the Fall:
The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C.
L. Rev. 311, 312-22 (1998).
18 The most notable case, Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963) (finding in favor of plaintiff on strict liability issue),
spanned 12 years and included six appeals and two jury trials.
19 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.
1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
20 See Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 541.
21 See Todd M. Blackmar, Note, Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.: The
Validity of Seeking Protection from Ourselves, 29 U. Tol. L. Rev. 727, 735 (1998).
22 In a rare case, a California jury awarded two million dollars in compensatory and
punitive damages to Milton Horowitz, a former smoker who developed mesothelioma after
smoking cigarettes in the 1950s that contained asbestos in their filters. See Sucin L.
Hwang, Former Smoker Is Awarded $2 Million in Suit over Illness Blamed on Filter, Wall
St. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at B6. The defendant's appeals eventually failed after Horowitz's
death in 1996. See Justices Refuse to Halt Lorillard Damage Payment, Wall St. J., May 19,
1998, at B12; Lorilard Pays $1.5 Million to Partly Settle Lawsuit, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at
13.
23 In August 1996, a Florida jury awarded $750,000. See John Schwartz, Florida
Smoker Wins $750,000 in Damages, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1996, at A3 (reporting on
landmark August 1996 Florida verdict against Brown & Williamson). The appeals court
found a statute of limitations problem and overturned the verdict. See Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 723 So. 2d 833 (Fla. App. 1998) (holding that action was
barred by statute of limitations). In another Florida case, the jury awarded the family of a
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turers suffered two multimillion dollar judgments, 24 but they also won
judgments of no liability in at least six cases brought by individual
plaintiffs.25
Despite the limited success of individual plaintiffs during this dec-
ade, however, the 1990s have seen several important changes that
have significantly affected the tobacco companies' fortunes. Plaintiffs
have asserted novel claims that the addictive qualities of nicotine
might relieve the plaintiff from the burden of assuming the risk.26
Plaintiffs are better financed than earlier plaintiffs had been.V A
flood of information and documents has come forth favorable to
plaintiffs' cases.2 Plaintiffs' lawyers may have discovered a relatively
dead smoker $1 million. See Myron Levin, Verdict Deals Tobacco Firms a Historic Defeat,
LA. Tunes, June 11, 1998, at Al (reporting on $1 million Florida verdict, noting first in-
stance of punitive damage award). This time, the case had been tried in the %,ong venue,
and the appellate court overturned the verdict. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Widdick, 717 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that trial court abused its
discretion in denying motion for change of venue).
24 A California jury returned a $51.5 million verdict and an Oregon plaintiff received
an $803 million verdict. See Milo Geyelin, Philip Morris Hit with Record Damages, Wall
St. J., Mar. 31, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Geyelin, Record Damages] (reporting on Oregon
verdict against Philip Morris). The tobacco industry has appealed and both verdicts wiere
reduced. See Milo Geyelin, Philip Morris Punitive Damages Cut 50% to $25 Million in
California Case, Wall St. J., Apr. 7,1999, at B6; Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Firms Win a Verdict
in Cancer Case, Wall St. J., July 12, 1999, at A24.
25 A $1 million verdict was overturned by an appeals court in Florida. See Ann Davis,
Appeals Court in Florida Throws Out $1 Million Brown & Viliamson Verdict, Wall St. J.,
Feb 2, 1999, at B8. In May of 1999, a Memphis jury found in favor of tobacco company
defendants and against the families of three deceased smokers. See Milo Geyelin, Tobacco
Firms Get a Victory in Tennessee Case, Wall St. J., May 11, 1999, at BS. Several da)s later,
a federal jury in Missouri found that Brown & Williamson was not liable for a death arising
from lung cancer. See Milo Geyelin, Brown & Williamson Wins Suit in Smoking Case,
Wall St. J., May 14, 1999, at B7. In June, a federal judge in Wisconsin granted motions for
summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of several tobacco manufacturers. See
Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that
plaintiffs failed to come forth with sufficient proof to create genuine dispute of fact). A
Mississippi jury refused to find the tobacco industry liable for the fatal disease resulting
from decades of breathing secondhand smoke. See Tobacco Industry Ruled Not Liable in
Mississippi Case, Wall St. J., June 3,1999, at A12- Most recently, a Louisiana jury returned
a verdict in favor of Brown & Wllliamson and R-I. Reynolds. See Brown & Williamson
Individual Case Courtroom (visited Jan. 16,2000) <http:/www.brownandwilliamson.comf
2_courthouse/l_individualiccrecenLhtml>.
26 See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud
and Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. Kan. L Rev. 465,471-85
(1998) (discussing recent plaintiff attempts to minimize assumption of risk defense).
27 See Milo Geyelin, Behind Giant Tobacco Verdicts, a Legal SWAT Team, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 12, 1999, at B1 (reporting that members of Tobacco Trial Lawyers Association pool
their assets and information and have pocketbooks deep enough to enable them to pay
thousands of dollars to cover administrative costs of growing organization).
28 Much of this information has become available through the attorneys general suits.
See Ann Davis, Tobacco Documents May Hold the Key to Florida's Suit, Wall St. J., May
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inexpensive but moderately effective way of trying tobacco cases.29
And public attitudes about smoking have shifted.30 Evidence of this
change includes prohibitions on smoking in public, even in bars,31 the
paucity of hotel rooms where smoking is permitted,32 and the sight of
smoking office workers huddled outside in freezing weather.
Further, the types of plaintiffs have begun to shift. First, class
actions in tobacco litigation began in 1994 with the landmark case
Castano v. American Tobacco Co. 33 Because of the difficulties with
class certification, class actions initially seemed to pose no real threat
to the tobacco industry.34 Recently, that proved untrue in one state
court case.35
11, 1998, at B2 (suggesting that documentation may affect tobacco litigation not only in
terms of proof but also in jury perception).
29 It appears that plaintiffs' attorneys have developed an assembly-line litigation
method enabling them to keep costs low without sacrificing effectiveness. See Geyelin,
supra note 27, at Bi.
30 See Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and
Culture 5-6 (1993) (noting change in popular culture toward smoking).
31 See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 6404.5 (West 1999) (prohibiting smoking in bars and tav-
erns); Julie Ha, L.A. Launches Crackdown on Smoking in Bars, Restaurants, L.A. Times,
July 8, 1999, at B3 (discussing new enforcement measures).
32 Only 45% of the hotel rooms in America are designated as smoking, and several
hotels are following a current trend of banning smoking altogether. See Larry Olmstead,
Smoke-Free Stays Not Always Guaranteed, Investor's Bus. Daily, May 11, 1999, at Al.
33 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying multistate class for recovering nicotine ad-
diction). After the Castano plaintiffs failed to gain certification, plaintiffs attempted to
form classes limited to residents of particular states. See Milo Geyelin, Lawyers Battling
the Tobacco Industry Are Confronting Logistical Nightmare, Wall St. J., May 28, 1996, at
A4.
34 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 734. The sole exception to the certification problem for
plaintiffs was Broin v. Philip Morris, Inc., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), a suit
on behalf of a class of flight attendants for damages related to exposure to second-hand
smoke. The tobacco companies settled the case for $349 million, none of which went to
individual plaintiffs; the money is to be used to establish a foundation that will study to-
bacco-related diseases and their treatment. See id.; Bob Van Voris, Latest Tobacco Head-
ache: Flight Attendants' Case, Nat'l L.J., May 26, 1997, at Al. The flight attendants can
still sue individually, but the settlement abrogates any claim for punitive damages. See
Dissident Flight Attendants Object to Secondhand Smoke Settlement, Wash. Post, Jan. 27,
1998, at A7. Similarly, asbestos class action settlements have repeatedly suffered from
certification issues, especially relating to exposed but currently asymptomnatic future plain-
tiffs. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999) (finding certification impermis-
sible due to insufficient showing of limited fund, inclusiveness, and equitable treatment);
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (decertifying class because
it fails typicality, adequacy of representation, predominance, and superiority require-
ments), aff'd, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
35 A Miami jury found the tobacco companies liable for concealment and civil conspir-
acy in the first class-action lawsuit ever to go to trial. See Milo Geyelin, 'Class' Trial Finds
Tobacco Firms Liable, Wall St. J., July 8, 1999, at A3. In Australia, smokers have brought a
class action against cigarette manufacturers. See Joanne Painter, Dying Man Leads First
Action Against Tobacco Companies, Sydney Morning Herald, Apr. 12, 1999, at 5, available
in 1999 WL 34603.
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Second, various governmental entities began to file their own
suits. More than forty states fied suit against the tobacco companies
to recover funds expended for treating tobacco-related illnesses of
their states' residents.3 6 The states asserted causes of action such as
fraud, antitrust, and conspiracy;37 the primary focus of the suits, how-
ever, was to force the tobacco industry to pay for the additional health
care costs incurred by the states because of their residents' smoking.38
Cities and municipalities followed, suing for costs incurred for treat-
ment of residents with tobacco-related illnesses.39 Some foreign coun-
tries have brought suit in American courts, including Bolivia,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Thailand, Venezuela, and Brazil.
40
Other countries and provinces, including British Columbia and the
Marshall Islands, have sued in their home courts.41 Even in France,
where smoking is widely accepted, a state health insurer has plans to
sue the tobacco industry.42 Union health funds and other insurers
have also sued to recover costs paid for treating individuals with to-
bacco-related illnesses. 4
3
36 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1996);
Junda Woo, Mississippi Wants Tobacco Firms to Pay Its Cost of Treating Welfare Recipi-
ents, Wall St. J., May 24, 1994, at A2.
37 See State Files Tobacco Suit, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1994, at Bl1 (discussing West Vir-
ginia suit).
38 See Plaintiff's Complaint, Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc. (No. CI-95-1324) (D.
Minn. Aug. 17, 1999) ("The premise of this action is that this industry... should pay for
the staggering health care costs caused by its actions in violation of the laws of this State.").
39 See, e.g., San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C-96-2090 DLI, 1998 WL 2309S0
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 3,1998) (stating plaintiff's claim that tobacco companies misled residents);
County of Cook v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 9703295, 1997 WL 667777 (N.D. I11. Oct. 17,
1997).
40 See Alison Frankel, One Planet, A Multitude of Tobacco Plaintiffs, Am. Law., Apr.
1999, at 24 (discussing suits brought by Bolivia, Thailand, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Nica-
ragua); Rio Sues U.S. Tobacco Firms for Cost of Treating Smokers, Wall St. J. Interactive
Ed., July 14, 1999 (discussing Brazil's suit) <http'/rmteractive.vsj.com>; see also Republic
of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1008-09 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (transferring
case, in humorous fashion, to United States District Court for District of Columbia as more
appropriate venue).
41 See Saundra Torry, Cigarette Firms Sued by Foreign Governments; Tobacco Industry
Faces Foreign Lawsuits in U.S., Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1999, at A12.
42 See French Agency to Sue Tobacco Companies, LA. Tunes, Feb. 17, 1999, at C2.
43 See, e.g., Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171
F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating claims to recover for costs of treating union members'
smoking-related illnesses); West Virgina-Ohio Valley Area I.B.E.W. Welfare Fund v.
American Tobacco Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 733, 734 (S.D. NV. Va. 1998) (same); Kentucky La-
borers Dist. Council Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 24 F. Supp.
2d 755, 761 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (same). In the first of these suits to go to trial, a federal jury in
Ohio found in favor of the tobacco industry against a class containing over 100 union
health funds. See bllo Geyelin, Tobacco Firms Win in Union-Fund Trial, Wall St. J., Mar.
19, 1999, at A3. An Israeli health fund has also sued. See Israeli Lawyer Takes on Big
Tobacco, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 12, 1998, at All.
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Together, these developments portend a less rosy future for de-
fendant tobacco companies than their winning records might predict.
An $80 million verdict in Oregon, before a judge who was described
as fair and not adverse to the tobacco industry, may be especially sug-
gestive of these new dangers. 44 It is thus unsurprising that the tobacco
companies entered negotiations with representatives from the biggest
group of plaintiffs, the state attorneys general.
B. The Settlement with the States
1. First Negotiations with the Attorneys General
Representatives of the tobacco industry began settlement negoti-
ations with a small group of the attorneys general in the spring of
1997.45 The tobacco companies agreed to make a large payment to
the states. In exchange, the attorneys general would endorse a federal
bill that would limit the tobacco companies' liability to individual and
class plaintiffs in various ways and would modify some aspects of the
public health law. An agreement to this effect (AG Agreement) was
reached between the tobacco companies and the attorneys general
group on June 20, 1997.46
Although the AG Agreement's proposal for federal legislation
was not adopted by Congress, it is worth examining here. First, the
proposal is relevant to our analysis of the settlement that was eventu-
ally made between the states and the tobacco companies. More im-
portantly, any future federal legislative proposals will almost surely
use the civil liability limitations in the AG Agreement as a template. 47
We concern ourselves with two aspects of the original proposal: the
payments by the tobacco companies, and the changes to civil liability.
a. Payments and Recipients of Payments. The total payment
under Title VI (Programs/Funding) of the AG Agreement over the
44 See Geyelin, Record Damages, supra note 24, at A3. It appears that the presiding
judge in Portland held no particular grudge against the tobacco manufacturers. Judge
Anna Brown had thrown out a claim that Marlboros are a defective product. She held that
there was insufficient proof that Philip Morris had the opportunity to sell a safer alterna-
tive. See id.
45 See Milo Geyelin & Suein L. Hwang, What Brought Big Tobacco to the Table, Wall
St. J., Apr. 18, 1997, at BI (describing players in negotiations).
46 Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement, June 20, 1997 (visited Mar. 2, 2000) <http://
stic.neu.edu/6-20-settle.htm> [hereinafter AG Agreement].
47 For discussion of the settlement, see infra text accompanying note 77. We expect the
civil liability terms of the AG Agreement to be copied for two reasons. First, they were the
product of extended negotiation with the attorneys general. Second, terms similar to those
in the AG Agreement did appear in the McCain bill when it was in committee. See infra
note 65 and accompanying text.
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twenty-five years after signing was projected to be $368.5 billion.48
The identity of the persons who were to receive the lion's share of the
money was not clear.49 Assuming that approximately $3 billion would
have gone annually for research and educational programs, and that
an amount from $0 to $5 billion may have eventually gone to plain-
tiffs, $7 to $12 billion annually would have been available for division
among the states paid annually to the state governments.50
The payments to the states were justified principally as reim-
bursement of medical costs paid by the states.5' These payments were
not for the individual suffering of people who contracted diseases or
died from smoking. They were not payments to the states for the loss
of quality of life of smokers who would otherwise be working at a
higher level and enjoying life more fully, nor did they appear to go to
any individual plaintiff in a lawsuit. Rather, they were payments for
the economic loss to the states because the states-through the Medi-
caid programnwould pay out more money earlier than if their citi-
zens had not smoked.
b. Modification of Manufacturers' Civil Liability. Title VIII of
the Agreement sought restrictions on the manufacturers' potential
civil liability to individuals, governmental agencies, and others acting
48 See AG Agreement, supra note 46, tit. VI.
49 Title VII (Public Health Funds from Tobacco Settlement) contemplated annual pay-
ments in the range of $2 to $3 billion for various public health activities and the establish-
ment of a public health trust of $25 billion. In the first year of the Agreement, Si billion
would have gone to various programs to reduce tobacco use, fund research, assist the FDA
in enforcing certain provisions of the Agreement, and compensate those who lost tobacco
industry sponsorship. This amount would have gradually increased to S1.5 billion annually.
In each of the first four years of the Agreement, $1 billion would have been paid into a
trust fund to be used to help individuals quit smoking by providing financial assistance and
identifying the most effective methods of quitting. After four years, this amount would
have increased to $1.5 billion annually. See id. tit. VH. The annual payments were to
come out of the "total payment," which would have amounted to approximately S15 billion
per year starting in the fifth year.
50 However, the Agreement did "authorize and fund from Industry Payments the an-
nual payment to all states of significant, ongoing financial compensation to fund health
benefits program expenditures and to establish and fund a tobacco fund liability judgment
and settlement fund." Id. Preamble, at 3. In addition, a proposed consent decree between
the tobacco industry and the states would have reiterated "obligations to make monetary
payments to the States reflecting their reasonable share of the total provided by the Act."
Id. tit. M1(B). "Significant financial compensation" and "reasonable share" were not
defined.
51 See John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Tobacco Pact Calls for Strict Federal Controls,
Wash. Post, June 21, 1997, at Al (outlining agreement regarding payment to states and
federal control over manufacture and marketing of cigarettes); John Schwartz, U.S. Wants
Share of Tobacco Deals, Wash. Post, Nov. 5,1997, at A19 (explaining federal government's
plan to recover its pro-rata share of Medicaid-related recovery).
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on behalf of injured smokers. 52 First, Title VIII(A)(1) provided for
the dismissal of current actions and prohibition of future actions by
the attorneys general or by any other arm of government. Second,
Section (B)(1) barred punitive damages in individual tort actions.
Third, Title VIII(4)(1) barred plaintiffs from bringing "addiction"
claims.53 Fourth, Section (B)(2) prohibited class actions or similar
consolidations. 54 An explicit provision allowing removal to the fed-
eral courts further protected the tobacco companies from adverse
state court interpretations of these rules. 55 Whether the bar would
have been a large or small change in current law depends upon how
one reads the cases56 in both federal and state courts that have denied
class certification and the Florida case that allowed it. The removal
rule may have had some effect, as federal courts appear to have been
more vigilant in restricting class actions than have state courts. 57
Taken together, it is possible that the prohibitions on class actions
and punitive damages, and the restriction on "addiction" claims,
would have stifled civil tobacco litigation. To the extent class actions
52 In part, they also received a restriction on the power of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration to outlaw tobacco. See AG Agreement, supra note 46, Preamble, tit. I.
53 Although the AG Agreement did not define "addiction," this provision may have
been intended to bar affirmative "addiction" claims that have recently been used as a
counter to the defense of assumption of risk.
54 Both of the latter two provisions applied only to suits for past behavior. With one
exception, Section C of Title VIII granted the tobacco manufacturers protections against
future claims similar to those granted in Section B as to past claims. The only important
exception was for punitive damages. Section B barred recovery of punitive damages for
past acts; Section C allowed the recovery of punitive damages for future claims. Presuma-
bly, future claims were those that arose out of the tobacco manufacturers' behavior after
the effective date of the Agreement. Possibly the manufacturers were willing to expose
themselves to punitive damages for acts committed after the Agreement was signed on the
theory that the Agreement itself, the massive payments under it, and the education that
will be done as a part of it would have ruled out the possibility of punitive damages in the
future.
55 See id. tit. I(B)(2).
56 See, e.g., Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (decerti-
fying class of Pennsylvania smokers); Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 96-5070, 1997 WL
538921 (D.C. Super. Aug. 18, 1997) (denying plaintiffs motion for class certification of
District of Columbia smokers); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (limiting class action to Florida residents rather than broader class of
U.S. residents that lower court had certified). But see Hoskins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., N.Y. Li., Oct. 31, 1997, at 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 30, 1997) (certifying damages class of
nicotine dependent New York residents and injunctive class of New York cigarette
purchasers).
57 See, e.g., Saundra Torry, Cigarette Firms Lose Huge Suit: Jury Finds 'Outrageous
Conduct', Wash. Post, July 8, 1999, at Al ("Florida's courts have interpreted statutes al-
lowing class action cases much more loosely than other states and federal courts."). See
generally Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1336 (1999) (arguing that neither federal nor state courts should certify
statewide tobacco class actions).
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became less available, for example, plaintiffs' lawyers might be less
willing to undertake the cost of expensive experts, motions and inter-
locutory appeals, the substantial risk of a trial loss,58 and the certain
appeal of any victory by a tobacco defendant,5 9 all for the sake of an
individual plaintiff with no possibility of punitive damages.60
Furthermore, Title VIII limited the total amounts to be paid by
the tobacco companies in settlement and for judgments for past and
future acts to "33 percent of annual industry base payments," a figure
that effectively capped total annual payments to injured plaintiffs at $5
billion (ignoring upward adjustments because of inflation).61 While
the tobacco manufacturers' liability to plaintiffs was limited to one-
third of their annual payment in any one year, the provision also gave
them a credit for 80% of any amount paid to plaintiffs.62
58 American juries have tended to focus on the individual responsibility of smokers and
absolve the tobacco companies of liability for smoking-related harms. See Valerie P. Hans,
The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs.
177, 198 (1989). "Despite... internal documents detailing how much the companies knew
about the addictiveness of nicotine and the health risks of smoking, most people still be-
lieve smoking is a personal choice and that smokers have only themselves to blame for
their illnesses." Milo Geyelin, Focus Groups Back Tobacco Firm's Stance, Wall St. J., July
23, 1996, at B5.
59 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990) (appealing,
primarily, jury instructions), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 404 (1992); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 723 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (appealing
for statute of limitations violations among other issues); Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Widdick, 717 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (appealing trial court's denial of
motion to transfer venue).
60 Today tobacco suits are extraordinarily expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers. See Haines
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 418 (D.NJ. 1993) (citing law firm's motion to
withdraw as plaintiff's counsel, enumerating costs exceeding S5 million); Andrew Blum,
Anti-Smoking Cause Gets Infusion of New Blood, Nat'l UJ., Oct. 30, 1989, at 1 (calling
plaintiff's victory in watershed tobacco case "pyrrhic" because of high costs).
61 The "base payment" under Title VI rose from a total of S6 billion in year one to S15
billion in year nine. According to Section VIII(B)(9), amounts unpaid in one year because
of the 33% cap would have rolled over to succeeding years. Also under paragraph (9),
only the first $1 million of any judgment for more than S1 million was to be paid until
others were paid in any year when the 33% aggregate cap was reached. Thus, if one recov-
ered a $2 million judgment and the total of the judgments in that year exceeded one-third
of the base payment, the claimant would have received a payment of no more than S1
million in the first year, the remaining portion would then roll over to the second year. It is
unclear whether payments carried over from the first year would have come ahead of or
behind settlements and judgments in year two or whether all would share pro rata.
6 This term was found in a single sentence in Title VUI(9) that read as follows: "Any
judgmentslsettlements run against defendant but give rise to 80 cents on the dollar credit
against annual payment in the year paid." This provision was not explained in any way.
The text following it reads, "Suitable provision for settlement consultation and permission.
Manufacturers control insurance claims, and any insurance recovery obtained by manufac-
turers (net of cost) on account of judgment and/or settlement covered by above sharing
arrangement allocated 80% to annual payments. Manufacturers retain any insurance pro-
ceeds on account of defense costs." AG Agreement, supra note 46, tit. VII(B)(9).
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The 80% credit was a critical part of the AG Agreement and is
likely to reappear in any twenty-first-century federal legislation. As-
sume that the tobacco manufacturers would have received a bill from
a governmental agency each year for approximately $15 billion. This
bill would come whether they settled cases with 100 plaintiffs, 1000
plaintiffs, or no plaintiffs. Apparently, the manufacturers could de-
duct 80% of these settlements from the $15 billion charge. Together
with the provision limiting the annual liability to one-third of the base
payment (one-third of $15 billion), the maximum payment made to
plaintiffs would be $5 billion, while the maximum deduction would be
80% of $5 billion, or $4 billion. This means that in a year when a $15
billion payment was due and in which the tobacco manufacturers paid
$5 billion in settlement of lawsuits, their total payment would be $16
billion ($5 + ($15-$4) = $16).
The formula led to two possible rewards in the A.G Agreement
for potential plaintiffs, to be compared with the substantial drawbacks
the AG Agreement would have imposed on them.63 The Agreement
may have reduced the tobacco companies' incentive to oppose indi-
vidual suits. Under the 80% credit rule, tobacco manufacturers who
paid out $5 billion to plaintiffs received a credit against their $15 bil-
lion governmental bill of $4 billion (80% of the $5 billion paid to
plaintiffs). Each dollar paid to plaintiffs-up to $5 billion per year-
would thus cost only 20 cents. Even if the tobacco manufacturers suc-
cessfully opposed all lawsuits, they would still be presented with a
government bill for $15 billion. Their savings from complete success
would have been $1 billion, less the added costs of full-fledged
litigation.
It is possible that some tobacco companies would have litigated
all cases in order to achieve some portion of the $1 billion savings, or
at least those cases most likely to prove defense victories. Such ef-
forts, however, would be undertaken only if litigation could lower the
total annual judgments below $5 billion by at least an amount that
exceeded the added cost of that defense. If tobacco companies had a
choice of paying $5 billion annually either to a governmental agency
or to a set of plaintiffs, their incentive to oppose the plaintiffs' suits
63 It is not clear that any explicit provision in the AG Agreement favored plaintiffs.
Even the provision that established the settlement fund may not have favored plaintiffs.
Absent the AG Agreement, the money that would have gone into the fund-and more-
would have been available in the treasury of the various tobacco manufacturers. A provi-
sion of the settlement that may have helped plaintiffs established a depository for tobacco
industry documents. It is not clear how helpful this would be, since so many documents
have already come out. Minnesota alone has gathered 33 million pages of internal tobacco
industry documents for its lawsuit against tobacco companies. See Pat Widder, Congress
Considers Tobacco Subpoena, Chi. Trib., July 31, 1997, at 5.
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would decline, perhaps even to zero. Presumably tobacco manufac-
turers would prefer to pay $5 billion to their former and current cus-
tomers than to governments. To the extent the formula would have
reduced the tobacco companies' incentives to litigate, either in general
or against deserving plaintiffs, the settlement would have given some-
thing of value to prospective plaintiffs.
The second advantage to plaintiffs, at least those of the more dis-
tant future, might be the allocation of cigarette manufacturers' cash
flows (i.e., the priority scheme) implicit in the AG Agreement. Since
the AG Agreement would have limited the total amount that plaintiffs
could recover from all manufacturers to $5 billion per year, it would
have protected most of the tobacco manufacturers from the danger of
bankruptcy resulting from one or more giant verdicts.64 As long as
the tobacco companies stayed in business, their assets would be avail-
able to future plaintiffs.
2. The Negotiation with Congress
During the last half of 1997, Congress held hearings on various
bills that were submitted to implement the AG Agreement. In March
1998, all of the various interests were close to agreement on a bill
introduced by Senator John McCain (McCain bill),65 which enlarged
and slightly modified the AG Agreement. As it appeared in commit-
tee, the bill had provisions protecting the tobacco manufacturers from
class actions and capping the tobacco industry's civil liability at $6-5
billion annually. It also settled all state suits. The cost had risen from
$368.5 billion in the AG Agreement to $516 billion in the McCain bill,
and some of the public health aspects were modified. The McCain bill
also required increases in cigarette prices to discourage youth smok-
ing. Otherwise, the federal bill was patterned after and similar to the
AG Agreement.
When the McCain bill was reported out of committee in April
1998, it did not have the protections from civil liability that were in the
original Agreement and in the committee version. Shortly after the
bill moved to the Senate floor, Steven Goldstone, CEO of RJR
Nabisco, publicly complained about the legislation and claimed that it
64 Liggett, with a market share of less than two percent, was exempt from paying to-
ward the initial $10 billion settlement payment to keep it out of bankruptcy. See Joel B.
Obermayer, Liggett Begs Hunt for Help, The News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 8,
1997, at D1, available in 1997 WL 7856560.
65 See S. 1414, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Albert R. Hunt, The McCain Tobacco Bill:
A Step Forward, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1998, at A23.
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would put the industry out of business. 66 The cigarette manufacturers
withdrew their support for the bill and successfully campaigned to de-
feat the legislation.67 They maintained that the deal was nothing more
than a tax hike on cigarettes that would largely affect lower-income
consumers.68 The McCain bill died in June 1998.69
3. Second Negotiations and Settlement
Prior to the failure of the federal legislation, a number of states
had already settled parts of their cases against the tobacco industry.70
In July 1997, Mississippi became the first state to make a deal with the
entire tobacco industry in a settlement totaling $3.4 billion.71 Florida
followed suit in August, making an $11.3 billion deal,72 and Texas set-
66 See Jeffrey Taylor, RJR's Chief Says Tobacco Deal Is Dead, Vall St. J., Apr. 9,1998,
at A3 (stating concern of RJR CEO Steven Goldstone that company would have to seek
bankruptcy protection if tobacco bill passed).
67 See Nancy Gibbs, The Tobacco Bill Almost Made It Until the Republicans Decided
to Blow It Off, Tune, June 29, 1998, at 38-40 (citing tobacco industry's $40 million ad cam-
paign as one reason bill died); Myron Levin, Unwittingly Allied Forces Laid Tobacco Bill
to Rest, L.A. Times, June 23, 1998, at Al ("Big Tobacco didn't like what Congress was up
to and rose up to swat away the threat.").
68 See Major Garrett & Kenneth T. Walsh, Congress Snuffs Out the Tobacco Bill, U.S.
News & World Rep., June 29, 1998, at 30 (discussing public's negative reactions to tobacco
bill thanks to anti-bill campaign); Melinda Henneberger, A Big Ad Campaign Helps Stall
the Bill to Reduce Smoking, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1998, at Al (alluding to plight of those
who would not be able to pay more for cigarettes).
69 See John McCain, We Blew It, Wash. Post, June 24, 1998, at A17 (stating that Senate
"has squandered the opportunity" to address serious national problem regarding smoking);
Saundra Torry & Helen Dewar, Senate GOP Kills McCain Tobacco Bill, Wash. Post, June
18, 1998, at Al. The tobacco industry spent $40 million on the anti-settlement advertising
blitz, and $58 million on lobbying during 1998. See Saundra Torry & Nathan Abse, Big
Tobacco Spends Top Dollar to Lobby: $58 Million in '98 Kept Legislation at Bay, Wash.
Post, Apr. 9, 1999, at A37. Even after the McCain bill was dead, industry lobbying contin-
ued to prevent its revival. See id. It is unclear whether the tobacco manufacturers with-
drew their support because the bill that was introduced omitted the protections from
individual suits or whether they thought the cost was too high even if the protections had
still been in place.
70 In March 1996, Liggett began settling with states, starting with Mississippi, Louisi-
ana, West Virginia, Florida, and Massachusetts. See Liggett Pays First Part of Tobacco
Settlement, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1996, at A10. It continued the trend by settling with twenty
more states a year later. See John M. Broder, 20 States Ask the White House to Spare
One Cigarette Maker, N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 21, 1997, at A19 (discussing Liggett's settlement
deals with states).
71 See John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Tobacco Firms, Mississippi Settle, Wash. Post,
July 4, 1997, at Al.
72 See John Schwartz, Cigarette Makers Settle Florida Suit for $11.3 Billion, Wash.
Post, Aug. 26, 1997, at Al; see also State v. American Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466H (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 25, 1997) (approving and adopting settlement), cited in 723 So. 2d 263, 266-68
(Fla. 1998). The trial judge's plan called for punitive damages to be awarded in one lump
sum. The Florida State Court of Appeals initially rejected this plan. In late October, how-
ever, a Florida State Court of Appeals panel revived the prospect of a lump-sum punitive
damage award. See Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Firms Suffer Setback as Court Revives Pros-
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tled at the beginning of 1998 for $14.5 billion.73 Minnesota took its
case to trial and settled after closing arguments for more than $6.5
billion.74
In the wake of the four state settlements and the failed legisla-
tion, the tobacco companies and the states began another attempt to
settle all state claims. Negotiations grew out of an attempted media-
tion in the lawsuit that the state of Washington brought against the
industry; officials from other states with pending lawsuits were
brought in to the secret talks.75 In November 1998, the states and the
tobacco industry made a deal to be offered to each of the remaining
states implemented through consent decrees in each state's court.7 6
This Master Settlement Agreement (Settlement) was released on No-
vember 14, 1998, and all forty-six states speedily approved it.77
Currently, most small states have already developed disburse-
ment programs, while interest groups in large states continue to wran-
gle over the pot.78 Most states seem to be allocating a small part of
the Settlement to antismoking advertising and the like.7 9 Many allo-
pect of Big Damage Award, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1999, at B19. Recently, the Florida
Supreme Court has decided to review a request by tobacco companies to block the puni-
tive damage award in this case. See Gordon Fairclough, Florida High Court is Reviewing
Request to Block Tobacco-Case Punitive Award, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1999, at A4.
73 See Saundra Torry & Ceei Connolly, Tobacco Firms Set to Pay Texas $14.5 Billion,
Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al.
74 See John Schwartz, Tobacco Settles Minnesota Suit, Wash. Post, May 9,1998, at Al.
Minnesota's case benefited from first rate plaintiffs' counsel and a judge hostile to the
cigarette manufacturers. See id. (discussing judge's jury instructions and state's largest
ever compilation of internal industry documents for case, as well as compelling witnesses
and arguments).
75 See Saundra Torry, Tobacco Giants Try to Settle with States, Wash. Post, July 10,
1998, at Al (discussing meetings between industry negotiators and states' lawyers).
76 See Master Settlement Agreement, Nov. 14, 1998, exh. L (visited Mar. 2, 2000)
<www.tobacco.neulExtralmultistate._settlement.htm>.
77 See Barry Meier, Remaining States Approve the Pact on Tobacco Suits, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 21, 1998, at Al.
78 See Shailagh Murray, Most States to Spend Tobacco Settlement on Improving
Health Care, Survey Says, Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 2000, at B6; Richard Pdrez.Pefla, State Ef-
forts to Cut Smoking Leave New York Far Behind, N.Y. Tiames, May 30, 1999, at Al
(describing New York as laggard in combating smoking). While politicians are stating that
they are spending much of this money for health care, in fact, as in California, much of it is
being dumped into the general fund without any specific assurance that it will ever find its
way into health care or any other form that would directly benefit smokers as a group. See
Shirley Leung, So Far, California Is Being General on Tobacco Cash, Wall St. J. (Cal. ed.),
Mar. 8, 2000, at CA2, available in Westlaw, WSJ database.
79 For example, Florida has already spent S100 million of its tobacco settlement funds
to combat smoking. See Conrad deFiebre, Tobacco Cash Flowing In, but So Fhr, Not Out,
Star Tribune (Mmneapolis, Minn.), May 2, 1999, at Al. In Iowa, Attorney General Tom
Miller has stated that he would like to see some of Iowa's $1.7 billion award, possibly 10%,
to be spent on efforts to counter tobacco ads and to enforce las banning the sale of
tobacco to minors. See Jane Norman, Iowa Payout Is S1.7 Billion, Des Moines Register,
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cate some part of the money to health care in some form that is not
necessarily associated with tobacco-related disease.80 But in many
states, some overtly and (we suspect) others covertly, the money is
going into the general treasury for uses completely unrelated to health
care or smoking. For example, Rhode Island and New York intend to
balance their budgets, and Oklahoma will pay down a $1 billion bond
issue.8' Because the amounts allocated to health care in states that
make such allocations do not appear to absorb the entire payment, we
suspect that even in those states a large residue will find its way into
the states' general funds.
The Settlement preserves few of the protections for the tobacco
industry that were present in the AG Agreement. It does not prohibit
class actions or punitive damages, nor does it cap the industry's poten-
tial liability for each year. The deal totals $206 billion through the
year 2025,82 the biggest portions of which are the annual payments to
Nov. 17, 1998, at lA. The Maryland General Assembly has decided that a part of the
tobacco settlement money will be spent on smoking prevention programs. See Scott
Shane, Curran Weighs Tobacco Gamble, The Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 17, 1998, at IA. Most
of the members of Utah's legislature have already agreed that a large portion of the state's
settlement funds should go toward youth tobacco intervention programs. See Bob Bernick
Jr., $157 Million Additional Tobacco Money, The Deseret News (Salt Lake City), May 25,
1999, at B5.
80 Mississippi has set aside funds of $4.1 billion to create a health care trust fund for its
citizens. See deFiebre, supra note 79. Nebraska has already allocated its $1.17 billion
award toward a health trust fund for the purposes of hiring school nurses, immunizing
children, and testing for breast cancer and cholesterol. See Robynn 'Iysver, State Accepts
Tobacco Deal, Omaha World-Herald, Nov. 17, 1998, at 1. Texas has appropriated some
$180 million to a health insurance program for low-income children. See Clay Robinson,
So Much Money, and So Much Controversy, Hous. Chron., May 30, 1999, Outlook, at 2,
available in 1999 WL 3993228.
81 In Rhode Island, Governor Lincoln Almond's budget proposal requires the state to
spend its entire $63 million first settlement installment (to be paid in 2000) to balance the
budget. See Christopher Rowland, Let's Not Count Tobacco Money Until It's Here, Pires
Cautions, Providence J., Apr. 14, 1999, at B5. New York Governor George Pataki has
proposed using a large portion of the settlement funds to reduce the state's debt. See
Richard Pdrez-Pefia, New York Politics May Hold Up Most of Nation's Tobacco Cash,
N.Y. Tmes, Apr. 11, 1999, at Al (stating that governor "is counting on the first $63 million
to help balance next year's budget"). Oklahoma legislative leaders and Governor Frank
Keating are pushing for a "$1 billion bond issue to be repaid from Oklahoma's anticipated
tobacco industry settlement windfall." Ken Neal, The Tobacco Settlement: How About a
$10-Billion Endowment for Oklahoma, Tulsa World, May 16, 1999, available in 1999 WL
5400642.
82 The tobacco industry is to transfer $2.4 billion as an initial payment to the states.
Although it is less than the $10 billion contemplated by the AG Agreement, the initial
payment to the states will eventually total $12.74 billion over 5 years. The base amount in
2000 is $4.5 billion; it gradually increases to $9 billion in 2018 and for every year thereafter.
See Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 76, § IX(c)(1). Other payments include
$250 million over 10 years to help fund a foundation whose goals are reduction of youth
smoking and prevention of tobacco-related illnesses. See id. § VI(b). This foundation will
receive an additional $300 million per year starting in 2004 if the market share of the
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be made by the industry and distributed to the states.83 Unlike the
AG Agreement, which only vaguely indicated that money was to go to
the states, the Settlement clearly delineates the percentage of the Set-
tlement funds that each state will receive.8 4 Its provisions touch upon
restrictions on marketing and advertising, &s restrictions on lobbying,86
reduction of tobacco use by minors, 7 and elimination of actions
brought against the tobacco industry by state or local government en-
tities.88 It also contains certain provisions, which we analyze below,
that keep out competing cigarette manufacturers.
C. Explaining the Settlement
By their separate agreements with four states and the Settlement
with the remaining forty-six, the tobacco manufacturers have made
agreements that will cause them to pay more than $240 billion to the
fifty states by the year 2025.s9 We believe that the states had only one
meritorious claim against the tobacco manufacturersp namely subro-
Participating Manufacturers exceeds 99.05% and continues to do so. See id. § IX. A pub-
lic education fund run by the foundation will receive S1.45 billion over the course of five
years. See id.
83 See id.
84 See id. exh. A (listing percentage of funds to be allocated to each state).
85 See id. § m(a)-(j).
86 See id. § 1II(m), exh. F.
87 See id. § I(a).
88 See id. § Il(pp)(1) (releasing past, present, and future claims of any "Settling State's"
subdivisions).
89 In the Settlement, the tobacco companies agreed to pay roughly $206 billion by 2025
to the 46 states. See id. § IX(a)-(c). This payout was in addition to the separate agree-
ments with Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota (totaling $40 billion). See Milo
Geyelin, Top Tobacco Firms Agree to Pay States Up to $206 Billion in 25-Year Settlement,
Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at A3.
90 Because subrogation allows the tobacco industry to use the same defenses against
the government that it could use against individual smokers, see, e.g., Iron Workers Local
Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 771, 778 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(discussing individual and subrogation claims); see also infra Part I.E, states prefer to
bring direct claims. However, most of the states' other causes of action against the tobacco
industry are either subrogation claims in disguise or are invalid. See, e.g., Minnesota v.
Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.V.2d 490,495 (Minn. 1996) (rejecting all direct tort claims as too
remote); see also Massachusetts Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 62
F. Supp. 2d 236,239 (D. Mass. 1999) (dismissing all nonsubrogation claims). Typical com-
mon law causes of action asserted by various states included indemnity, voluntary assump-
tion of a special duty, and unjust enrichment; statutory claims were based either on
consumer protection statutes or state and federal antitrust law. Although the Settlement
mooted these claims, before the Settlement several courts dismissed states' complaints for
failure to state causes of action. In short, few of the nonsubrogation claims were success-
ful. This footnote discusses these claims.
First, states' indemnity claims are invalid. Indemnity arises in cases where a wrongful
act of one party creates vicarious liability for the other, and the other pays that liability.
The passive wrongdoer who discharges the duty is generally entitled to indemnity. See
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Douglas Laycock, Modem American Remedies 646-47 (2d ed. 1994). Indemnity is not
available to a plaintiff who does not share a common liability with the party from whom
indemnity is sought. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 547-49 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that indemnity is unavailable to plaintiff who cannot establish common liability);
Stephenson v. McClure, 606 S.W.2d 208, 213-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (same), Although
only Iowa has ruled on indemnity in the smoking litigation, see Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, No.
CL 71048 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 1997) (visited Sept. 19, 1999) <http://stic.neu.edu/la/
dec8-26.htm>, aff'd sub noma., Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401
(Iowa 1998), the United States Supreme Court denied indemnity to the federal govern-
ment in similar circumstances in 1947. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,
313 (1947) (holding that indemnity claim is matter for Congress, not Court); see also
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258,268-69 (1992) (citing difficul-
ties establishing proximate cause for similar indemnity claim). The Iowa court dismissed
the state's indemnity claim because injuries suffered by the state were too indirect to satisfy
proximate cause. See Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, No. CL 71048, at 4-5. The court noted that
the state could state a cause of action under Iowa's subrogation statute. See id. at 3-4.
Second, states' claims for breach of a special duty of care lack merit, both because the
states cannot satisfy the physical injury requirement of that cause of action, and because
the tobacco industry has not breached any duty to the states, as noted in the Restatement:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertak-
iag, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b)
the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965) (emphasis added). Section 324A continues:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertak-
ing, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm,
or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.
Id. § 324A (emphasis added). States alleged that the tobacco industry voluntarily assumed
a duty of care when it undertook to monitor and study the health effects of tobacco use,
and that the industry breached this duty when it manipulated its findings. By and large,
courts have rejected this claim. See Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956,
973 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (refusing to extend liability under § 323 to create duty undertaken by
corporate advertising); Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, No. CL 71048, at 6-7 (dismissing claim alleg-
ing breach of duty voluntarily assumed because plaintiff failed to show physical harm);
Washington v. American Tobacco, Inc., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA, 1997 WL 714842, at *1-*4
(Wash. Super. Ct. June 6, 1997) (same). This claim is also vulnerable because of the "eco-
nomic loss doctrine." See id. (noting well-established rule that if only loss due to negli-
gence is economic one, it is not legally cognizable). Courts have also rejected similar
claims by nongovernmental insurers. See, e.g., Laborers' & Operating Engineers' Utility
Agreement Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (D.
Ariz. 1999) (finding no breach of assumed duty under §§ 323 and 324A when there was no
physical injury to plaintiff); Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1182-83 (D. Or. 1998) (same).
Additionally, many states claimed recovery for unjust enrichment. The courts' analy-
sis of these claims has been inconsistent, but the courts have dismissed them nonetheless.
Some courts hold that unjust enrichment is not available if any other remedy is available.
See Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, No. CL 71048, at 7-8; Maryland v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
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96122017, 1997 WL 540913, at *215 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 21, 1997) (holding that plaintiff had
no right to recover at common law); Washington v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., No. 96-2-
15056-8 SEA, 1996 WL 931316, at *9 (Super. Ct. Wash. Nov. 19, 1996) (holding that Wash-
ington Product Liability Act preempts unjust enrichment claim); McGraw v. American
Tobacco Co., No. 94C-1707, 1995 WL 569618, at *2 (V. Va. Cir. Ct. June 6,1995) (holding
that attorney general of West Virginia has no common law authority). We do not agree
with these cases. See Hanoch Dagan, Unjust Enrichment: A Study of Private Law and
Public Values 5-6 (1997) (explaining that claims based on restitution for unjust enrichment
stand independent of claims based on tort); see also infra Part fl.B. A federal district court
in Pennsylvania did provide the correct analysis of this claim, that the plaintiff's unjust
enrichment cause of action was really just a badly stated subrogation claim. See Steamfit-
ters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. Civ.A.97-5344,1993 WL
212846, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1998). Part ILB elaborates on this issue, explaining that
legal subrogation is a subspecies of unjust enrichment, a restitutionary recovery for the
unsolicited conferral of benefits.
Courts also assert that the alleged benefit conferred by the states does not satisfy any
duty of the tobacco industry and is too attenuated to be actionable. See Iowa v. RJ. Reyn-
olds, No. CL 71048, at 8; Maryland v. Philip Morris, 1997 WL 540913, at *17; Washington v.
American Tobacco, 1996 WL 931316, at *9; McGraw, 1995 WL 569618, at c1-*2. We disa-
gree. See infra Part ll.D.
That the federal government has not alleged any of these or similar common law
causes of action against the tobacco industry in its lawsuit is telling. The United States
pursues relief under two federal subrogation statutes and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. See Plaintiff's CompL, United States v. Philip Morris,
Inc. (D.D.C. Sept. 22,1999) (No. 99-213). Even the smart and expensive folks working for
the United States place little faith in the merits of these common law claims. See David S.
Cloud et al., Justice Reverses: Lobbying Effort Wins brnabout on Tobacco Suit. Wall St.
J., Sept. 24, 1999, at B1.
The states' statutory claims are also tenuous. Claims based on consumer protection
statutes survived the tobacco manufacturers' motion to dismiss in Iowa, Maryland, Minne-
sota, and West Virginia. See, e.g., Maryland v. Philip Morris, 1997 WL 540913, at *17.
Many of the states appear to state causes of action under the broad language of some of
the state statutes. For example,
[t]he State must merely allege that [the state] has sustained an injury or loss as
a result of Defendants' prohibitive conduct which, despite the difficulties of
proof that may arise at trial, it has properly done in claiming that it lost mil-
lions of dollars due to the tortious acts of Defendants.
Id. at *18. Under these statutes some of the states may have been entitled to injunctive
relief and possibly even to civil penalties. Whether states could ever recover for "tortious
acts" that cost the states money (e.g., Medicaid payments) but are not compensable torts
against the injured citizens is doubtfuL For example, the state of California might be able
to demonstrate that it suffered specific medical costs because of automobile accidents in-
volving automobiles manufactured by the Ford Motor Company. Could California have a
claim against Ford under the consumer statutes where Ford had committed no tort? No.
Similarly, most of the state antitrust claims survived the tobacco manufacturers' mo-
tions. See, e.g., id.; Washington v. American Tobacco, 1996 WL 931316, at 06. But see
Texas v. American Tobacco, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 969-70 (holding that "State has not suffered
the type of injury the antitrust laws were designed to prevent"). Despite this initial suc-
cess, we doubt that the states would have prevailed at trial on these issues. First consider
the allegation concerning the tobacco industry's conspiracy to fail to develop a safer ciga-
rette. It is contrary to the interest of a cigarette company to forego the bonanza awaiting
the company that makes a cigarette that has all of the beneficial and none of the deleteri-
ous effects of current tobacco cigarettes. Such a cigarette would capture a huge market
share instantaneously. Why then should one company conspire with another to fail to
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gation to the claims of their citizens against the tobacco manufacturers
in tort, to be discussed in Part II below. Since in subrogation actions
the manufacturers could raise all defenses that they could have raised
against the subrogors (assumption of risk, causation, and the like)-
given the current record of individual suits-it is likely that less than
half of the state suits would have been successful. 91
make such a cigarette? An additional response to this theory is that it is incorrect as a
historical and factual matter; in the 1970s, RJR developed and test marketed a "safe ciga-
rette" in Japan. The cigarette was a flop, according to Bryan Burrough and John Helyar in
Barbarians at the Gate; the principal consequence of the test marketing was to require
Americans to learn the Japanese term meaning "tastes like shit." See Bryan Burrough &
John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate 112 (1990). A final barrier that stands in the way of
recovery is that it is unlikely that any such cigarette can be developed and a conspiracy to
do what is impossible could not cause damage.
Other states claimed that the manufacturers violated their antitrust laws by conspiring
to fix prices. This claim was made in the face of public evidence of intense competition
among the major cigarette manufacturers. See Suein L. Hwang, Cigarette Makers in Dis-
count War to Lock in Share, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1998, at B1. We wonder what proof of
price fixing the states would have produced at trial. Note too, this claim is more than a
little ironic. The principal injury that the states assert in all of these cases arises from their
additional expenditure for health care costs caused by smoking. By hypothesis, a conspir-
acy to fix prices would raise prices and reduce the number of smokers who would other-
wise have been injured in a free market (with lower prices and more extensive use), so the
states in making these claims are talking out of both sides of their mouths. On the one
hand they complain that cigarettes cause added health costs but on the other hand they
complain because the cigarette companies have sold too few cigarettes.
Some proponents of the tobacco litigation justify states' claims on the basis of "lost
productivity of the citizenry." See Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, No. CL 71048, at 2; see also Texas
v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (justifying direct common law claims based
on state's "quasi-sovereign" interest in "the well-being of its populace"). But "loss of pro-
ductivity" is not a cause of action recognized under the common law. As the Supreme
Court noted in United States v. Standard Oil, entirely new causes of action require explicit
legislative approval. See 332 U.S. at 313-14 (refusing to create new cause of action from
heightened legal duty). In other words, democratic principles require more accountability
in the establishment of new tort claims. See infra Part IV. Second, this proposed cause of
action is problematic on its merits because it would open every "nonproductive" but addic-
tive activity to legal liability, such as loafing, recreational sex, and gluttony. For example,
would the government have a cause of action against the National Football League for
diverting thousands of citizens' hours from "productive" to "nonproductive" ends?
As Part II explains in detail, we believe that the restitutionary claim of subrogation
(with appropriate limits) remains an actionable claim. As the Maryland court remarked,
[a]t common law a plaintiff had no right to recover damages from a defendant
tortfeasor as a result of the defendant's injuries, harm, or lack of care to a third
person, regardless of the fact that the defendant's actions may have put the
plaintiff to what otherwise would have been unnecessary or increased expense.
Maryland v. Philip Morris, 1997 WL 540913, at *9. However, "in some instances, the plain-
tiff can recover from the defendant if the plaintiff has a legal right, under equitable princi-
ples of subrogation, to assert the legal claims of the injured third party in the name of the
injured third party." Id. at *12; see also Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 313 (noting that state
courts have greater freedom to create new common law liabilities).
91 In individual suits against the tobacco manufacturers concluded in 1999, less than
half of the plaintiffs won. See supra note 25. If one assumes that the states would have
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Even if the states could have won on behalf of every injured
smoker, the settlement would still greatly exceed the expended costs.
Because the states pay no part of Medicare and approximately one-
half of Medicaid costs, and because private insurance companies and
the smokers themselves pay most health care costs associated with
smoking, the part of the total cost actually borne by the states is small.
A state's additional medical expenses attributable to a decedent's
smoking are approximately $557.92 Multiplying the number of deaths
from smoking by the $557 figure produces an annual cost to all of the
states of approximately $223 million.93
An alternative estimate is to apply $557 to each of the forty-six
million adult smokers.94 This calculation suggests that the states' total
Medicaid liability for all living adult smokers is no more than $32 bil-
lion. Adding a payment for all smokers who have died in the last five
years (as a proxy for those for whom statute of limitations has not
run) would increase the amount by $557 x 5 x 400,000 = $1.1 billion.
done no better, 25 or more of the states would have lost their suits. For example, before
the settlement was reached, Iowa's claim was rejected on appeal by its own supreme court.
See Iowa ex reL Miller, 577 N.W.2d 401. Similarly, after the tobacco manufacturers' mo-
tion to dismiss was granted as to Washington's most promising causes of action (restitution
and unjust enrichment), the state's case was on the ropes. See Washington v. American
Tobacco, 1996 WL 931316. The dismal record of unions and private insurance companies
as plaintiffs suggests that the states might have fared even worse. See supra note 43.
92 This figure is derived from the Manning Study published in 1991. See Willard G.
Manning et al., The Costs of Poor Health Habits 67-85 (1991). In 1936 dollars, that study
determined that a smoker will incur $6,000 more in lifetime medical costs than a non-
smoker. However, most of this expense is not assumed by the individual states. The Cen-
ters for Disease Control (CDC) estimate that Medicaid only covers 102% of these
smoking-related expenditures. See Medical-Care Expenditures Attributable to Cigarette
Smoking-United States, 1993,43 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 468,471 (1994). Fur-
thermore, not all Medicaid expenses are borne by the individual state. For instance, the
federal government matched an average of 60.47% of state Medicaid funds in 1995. See
Congressional Info. Serv., Health Care State Rankings, in 1995: Health Care in the 50
United States 287 (May 1995). Therefore, if Medicaid covers roughly 10% of the medical
costs associated with smoking, and of that 10%" only half is paid by the individual state,
then the total lifetime medical costs a smoker will impose on his respective state in 1986
dollars equals $300. The present value of $300 in medical costs in 19S6 equals approxi-
mately $557 in 1999. See Bureau of Labor Statistics Data, Consumer Price Index-All
Urban Consumers (visited Aug. 2, 1999) <httpJ/vww.bls.gov/top2O.html>. The annual av-
erage value of 122.0 was used for 1986, and the June value of 250.2 was used for 1999. See
id.
93 The 400,000 deaths per year estimated here is slightly lower than the CDC's 1990
estimates. See Mortality Trends for Selected Smoking-Related Cancers and Breast Can-
cer-United States, 1950-1990, 42 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 857, 857 (1993) (esti-
mating that 419,000 deaths in United States during 1990 were attributable to smoking).
94 This 1993 estimate defined current cigarette smokers as those who had smoked at
least 100 cigarettes and who reported that they smoke every day or some days. See Ciga-
rette Smoking Among Adults-United States, 1993, 43 Morbidity & Mortality Wk-y. Rep.
925 (1994).
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The manufacturers could satisfy their entire potential liability to the
states for all adults currently smoking and for those who have died
within the last five years for about $30 to $35 billion, a fraction of the
amount they have agreed to make to the states. This amount assumes
a charge for every single smoker and assumes it is paid at once even
though many of the costs for living smokers will be incurred far in the
future.
In agreeing to the Settlement, the tobacco companies have thus
probably agreed to pay the states a much larger amount than the
states could have expected to recover had every case gone to judg-
ment (even if we assume some additional, unidentified costs attrib-
uted to legitimately subrogated preventative and ameliorative costs).
Yet, the tobacco companies have received no direct protection from
bankruptcy. While it would take many large recoveries to bankrupt
even the weakest companies, recall that plaintiffs' asbestos suits went
from certain defeats to routine victories in the blink of an eye.95 Past
victories give little comfort, particularly to an industry that sees new
evidence of its pariah status everywhere it turns.9 6
Why would an industry agree to pay far more than the present
value of its probable liability and agree to a settlement that does not
give it what it most needs-protection from bankruptcy? We see sev-
eral reasons, some plain, some subtle and speculative. First, the to-
bacco manufacturers did gain important indirect protections from
bankruptcy. Second, the tobacco manufacturers achieved explicit pro-
visions that minimize competition from new tobacco manufacturers
who did not sign the Settlement.
1. Safety from Bankruptcy
We believe the holy grail for the tobacco manufacturers is federal
protection from bankruptcy.
The financial stakes in the state suits were particularly great be-
cause the tobacco manufacturers faced a queue of state plaintiffs
95 In 1964, a significant link was acknowledged between lung cancer and mesothelioma
and exposure to asbestos. See Sandrea Friedman, Note, Manville: Good Faith Reorgani-
zation or "Insulated" Bankruptcy, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 121, 124-25 (1983). This resulted in a
floodgate of litigation beginning in the late 1960s against asbestos-producing companies
such as Manville, which at one point "boast[ed] annual sales of approximately two billion
dollars." Id. at 121. Overnight, Manville tumbled from Fortune 500 status into bankruptcy.
See id.
96 Certainly the market sees this risk. Prior to its spinoff in 1999, the market valued
RJR's domestic tobacco subsidiary at less than zero. See Andrew Bary, Unfazed by Rates,
Stocks Roar Ahead at Week's End, Barron's Bus. Wk., June 7, 1999, at MW3. The pres-
ence of certain specific terms (especially the $5 billion annual cap) in the AG Agreement
and in the original McCain bill shows that the tobacco manufacturers also appreciate the
risk.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 75:354
SUBROGATION AND INJURIOUS INDUSTRIES
thirty or forty deep, each of whom could observe earlier trials and
learn from the mistakes of each prior plaintiff by bringing their suits in
seriatim fashion.97 Since any judgment would be due and owing in full
on the exhaustion of the defendants' appeals, the amount of the judg-
ment would have to be booked as a liquidated liability and, absent an
agreement with the plaintiff, would have to be paid at once, not over
twenty-five years out of future earnings.
Tobacco manufacturers would have faced financial dangers from
any large jury verdict even if the companies were eventually successful
on appeal. The prospect of obtaining a bond to cover such a judg-
ment, which might include punitive damages and treble damages,
posed a formidable threat.98 The cost of a bond would be enormous,99
and bonding companies might no longer be willing to write such bonds
for defendants facing thirty or forty more suits.
Given the risks of large judgments, seriatim suits, and the costs of
bonds, bankruptcy loomed as a real danger. At least one of the larg-
est three tobacco manufacturers carried a burden of hard debt bal-
anced against soft assets.'00 And bankruptcy for a tobacco
97 The prospect of a long line of plaintiffs with ever-increasing strength would have
been an unattractive prospect even if a tobacco manufacturer had no bankruptcy concerns.
98 On the last day of the trial, the tobacco companies settled with the state of Minne-
sota for $6.6 billion. See Milo Geyelin, Minnesota, Tobacco Firms in Settlement, Wall St.
J., May 11, 1998, at A3 (discussing Minnesota's S6.6 billion settlement for smoking health
care costs). Given some of the theories advanced by the plaintiff, the defendants reason-
ably could have feared a judgment as high as $10 or S15 billion. Texaco's experience in its
case against Pennzoil is also instructive: On November 17, 1985, a Harris County (Hous-
ton) civil jury awarded Pennzoil a judgment of S10.53 billion against the multinational oil
company, Texaco. See Matt Moffett, Pennzoil Wins S10.53 Billion in Suit Against Texaco;
Verdict Is Called Highest Civil Judgement in History, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1985, at 3.
Under Texas law, Texaco was required to post a supersedeas bond equal to the amount of
judgment plus interests and costs, in order to stay the enforcement of the judgment pend-
ing appeal. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250,257 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). After
Texaco's challenges to the bond requirement were rejected, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 33 (1987), Texaco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and settled vith
Pennzoil for $3 billion under a reorganization plan. See Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B.
Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75
Va. L. Rev. 295, 296 (1989).
99 To appeal a $10 billion judgment under Minnesota law, the defendants would have
had to post a bond equal to at least the amount of the lower court judgment. Minnesota
civil provisions concerning supersedeas bonds state that:
[i]f the appeal is from a judgment directing the payment of money, the condi-
tion of the bond shall be the payment of the judgment or that part of the
judgment which is affirmed and all damages awarded against the appellant
upon the appeal if the judgment or any part of it is affirmed or if the appeal is
dismissed.
Minn. R. App. P. 108.01(3).
100 Of RJR's $29 billion assets in 1998, trademarks made up roughly $7 billion and an
additional $11.5 billion were attributable to goodwill. See RJR Nabisco Holding Corp.,
Form 10-K: Annual Report, tbLF-3 (1998).
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manufacturer would not be the momentary unpleasantness it might be
for a defendant faced with a single plaintiff. Thousands of tobacco
plaintiffs might appear in the bankruptcy court with their unliquidated
claims. Some might ask the court to estimate the value of their claims
and to give them a large chunk of the company; others might find the
bankruptcy court to be a convenient forum to challenge the manufac-
turers' payment of dividends or other transfers of corporate assets as
fraudulent conveyances. Asymptomatic smokers could claim a share
of the estate based on asbestos bankruptcy precedents. 01
Although the Settlement did not provide the kind of explicit pro-
tections from bankruptcy that the AG Agreement would have, it
staved off threats of insolvency in two important ways. First, insofar
as states' claims are concerned, the Settlement completely forestalled
the possibility of a lucky hit that would have knocked all of the com-
panies into bankruptcy. It enabled the tobacco companies to pay over
many years, to book the liability piecemeal, and, perhaps, even to re-
duce the discounted cost of the total stream of payments.
Second, the Settlement will enlist the states and beneficiaries of
the payments to the states as new lobbying allies of the tobacco com-
panies in Congress in favor of liability-limiting bills. If the tobacco
companies filed a petition in Chapter 11, their payments under the
Settlement would be indefinitely postponed.102 Since the payments
have been negotiated and characterized as payments by a tortfeasor to
the states (as the injured party or as a subrogee to the injured party)
and not as taxes, the states would not enjoy the benefits that the
Bankruptcy Code confers on some state tax claims.'0 3 It seems likely
that the states' claims would be treated as mine-run unsecured claims,
requiring the states to compete with individual smokers. No state
would relish a fight with victims suffering debilitating and deadly dis-
eases over limited funds.
Bankruptcy would thus threaten the fortunes of many powerful
beneficiaries in the states, beneficiaries who are likely to come from
101 In In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Lit. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 982 F.2d 721
(2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1993), those exposed to asbestos but not
yet sick had to compete with conventional creditors and with persons already suffering
asbestos diseases. Although the courts were hesitant to recognize the former as "credi-
tors" under the Bankruptcy Code, the courts frequently provided for them by making them
beneficiaries of trusts that held the debtor's assets, or by other means. See, e.g., id. at 725-
32 (describing plight of Manville Trust). See generally Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass
Tort, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 846, 864-92 (1984) (describing payment devices to manage uncer-
tainty regarding aggregate claims liability).
102 See Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 76, § 549. In addition, § 362 would
automatically stay any attempt outside of the bankruptcy court to collect the amounts
under the Settlement. See id. § 362.
103 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8), 523(a) (1994).
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all parts of the political spectrum: from teachers unions on the left
(who benefit from use of the tobacco money for education), to munic-
ipalities in the middle, to businesses and individuals on the right (who
will face increased taxes if the tobacco money dries up). When a man-
ufacturer suffers the first threatening judgment and turns to the states,
municipalities, unions, and others requesting they use their influence
with Congress, we predict the various beneficiaries will spring to ac-
tion-just as any well paid lobbyist should.
1 4
2. Protection Against Competition
To meet its payments under the Settlement, the tobacco compa-
nies would have to raise the price per pack of cigarettes.105 At some
point new manufacturers (who, by hypothesis, have committed no
torts) might be able to enter the market and undersell the existing
manufacturers. The agreement with the states contains a diabolically
clever set of provisions to insulate the cigarette manufacturers from
such competition.
Section IX(d), titled "nonparticipating manufacturer adjust-
ment," adjusts the principal payments (particularly the "base amount"
which rises from $5 billion in 2001 to $9 billion in the year 2018 and
thereafter) downward if "nonparticipating manufacturers"-new to-
bacco manufacturers-take market share from the participating man-
ufacturers. A particular state's share of the payments is not merely
reduced dollar for dollar for the loss of share; it is reduced by a multi-
ple of the sales lost to the new entrants. If, for example, the partici-
pating tobacco manufacturers lose 10% of their market share to new
entrants, they will have a right under subsection (d) to reduce their
payments to the states by as much as 24%.106
Any state that passes the Settlement's model statute is freed from
any adjustment.'0 7 The model statute imposes a tax on new tobacco
entrants equal to approximately twenty cents per package in the year
2000, rising to thirty-six cents in the year 2007. If new entrants make
inroads on the signing manufacturers' market share, the nonpartici-
pating adjustment attributable to those inroads is spread among states
who have not adopted a similar tax. For example, if California adopts
104 That such a possibility would be on the minds of the tobacco manufacturers is shown
by the terms in the AG Agreement where an express part of the deal was that the attor-
neys general would lobby Congress for a federal annual cap and for other restrictions on
individual suits. See AG Agreement, supra note 46, it. VIII.
105 This of course is the appropriate fate of a tortfeasor, to internalize the cost of its bad
act and so insure that its product truly reflects the risks.
106 See Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 76, § XI(d).
107 See id. exh. T.
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the model tax on new entrants but half of the states do not, and a new
entrant takes 10% of the signers' market share in California, Califor-
nia will receive its regular base payment while the states who have not
adopted a similar tax will suffer a reduction in their base payment
(amounting to as much as 24% of California's share). So a failure to
tax new entrants can cost a state not only an exponential reduction of
payments that it would otherwise have received, but also an additional
reduction for inroads by new entrants in states that did adopt a tax.108
If, as we suspect, the new entrant tax and nonparticipating manu-
facturers' reduction will effectively exclude new entrants, the only loss
that will be suffered by the manufacturers' shareholders will come
from the reduction in demand caused by increased price. How elastic
cigarette demand is remains to be seen. If it is completely inelastic
and if new competition does not erupt among the existing manufactur-
ers, the entire cost of the deal is thrown on the backs of future smok-
ers. If, on the other hand, the settlement drives the cost of cigarettes
over some invisible tipping point-where their cost exceeds the plea-
sure conferred for many smokers-the shareholders will bear a signifi-
cant part of the cost.
II
GovERNMENTs vs. INiuIous INDUSTRIES: SUBROGATION
As mentioned in Part I, the states' litigation against the tobacco
industry focused on reimbursement of tobacco-related health care
costs.10 9 The causes of action actually brought by the states, however,
were invalid bases on which to make such claims.110 The states' com-
plaints neglected their true remedy: subrogation. This Part considers
how the states' claims fit into the scope of subrogation, a task requir-
ing an explanation of the underlying premises of restitution for unso-
licited benefits. We then discuss how the states' claims in subrogation
against injurious industries diverge from traditional insurance subro-
gation and explore how the peculiarities of the states' claims test the
scope and outer limits of the law of subrogation. Another question,
which we take up only in the last section of this Part, relates to the
108 The tax is justified in the Settlement in the most pious terms: "To protect the public
health gains achieved by this Agreement." Id. § XI(d). If the states had really wished to
have the tort system work as it should, however, they could have refused to agree to the
nonparticipating manufacturers' adjustment and could have applied a prospective tax to all
cigarettes. That would have made the tortfeasors bear the cost of their injuries while
avoiding punishing new entrants who have committed no torts.
109 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 90.
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interaction of common law subrogation with specific statutory
interventions.
A. Subrogation Defined
Subrogation is substitution."' It arises where one person (the
subrogee) pays another (the subrogor) to cover a loss or a debt for
which a third party is primarily liable.'12 The subrogee then enforces
the fights of the subrogor against that third party (the party primarily
responsible for the loss) for its own benefit.1" Subrogation has two
forms: contractual (also called conventional), and legal (also called
equitable). 114 Contractual subrogation (the most typical example is
insurance) exists by virtue of explicit agreement between the subrogee
and the subrogor, 15 while legal subrogation arises by law following
unsolicited conferral of benefits by one person on another.11 6 The
111 See Henry N. Sheldon, The Law of Subrogation § 1, at 1-2 (1893) ("[Subrogation] is
a substitution, ordinarily the substitution of another person in the place of a creditor, so
that the person in whose favor it is exercised succeeds to the rights of the creditor in rela-
tion to the debt."); see also, e.g., S.F. Dixon, Substituted Liabilities: A Treatise on the Law
of Subrogation 7 (1862); Ronald C. Hom, Subrogation in Insurance Theory and Practice 12
(1964) ("'Subrogation' is ... derived from the Latin subrogare, which means .. to
substitute.").
112 See Horn, supra note 111, at 13-14; see also Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and
Guaranty § 27 cmt. a (1995).
113 See A.S. Burrows, The Law of Restitution 76 (1992); G.H.L Fridman, Restitution
398 (2d ed. 1992); F. Joseph Du Bray, A Response to the Anti-Subrogation Argument:
What Really Emerged from Pandora's Box, 41 S.D. L Rev. 264, 265 (1996) (explaining
principle of enforcement of rights by subrogee against third party); Keith E. Edeus, Jr.,
Comment, Subrogation of Personal Injury Claims: Toward Ending an Inequitable Practice,
17 N. IlL U. L. Rev. 509, 511 (1997) (same); Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, Comment, Insurance
and Subrogation: When the Pie Isn't Big Enough, Who Eats Last?, 64 U. Chi. L Rev.
1337, 1338 (1997) (same). For a general discussion, see Lord Goff of Chieveley & Gareth
Jones, The Law of Restitution, 120-69 (Gareth Jones ed., 5th ed. 1998); see also Restate-
ment (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty § 28 (1996).
114 See Dixon, supra note 111, at 7 (identifying two types of subrogation); Horn, supra
note 111, at 22 (same); see also Burrows, supra note 113, at 207-11; Sheldon, supra note
111, § 5, at 6-7 (explaining two types of subrogation in Louisiana).
115 See Dixon, supra note 111, at 7 (distinguishing contractual subrogation from legal
subrogation); Horn, supra note 111, at 22 (same); see also Sheldon, supra note 111, § 5, at 7
(noting requirement in Louisiana that conventional subrogation be formally expressed).
116 See Burrows, supra note 113, at 207-11; Horn, supra note 111, at 22 (describing legal
subrogation); see also Sheldon, supra note 111, § 6, at 7 (same). An insurer's right to
recover against a responsible third party or tortfeasor for money that the insurer has al-
ready paid out to the insured victim is an example of legal subrogation. See Horn, supra
note 111, at 7 n47 (using fire insurance as example where legal subrogation would be
permitted). Other examples include an insurer's right to recoupment of an insured victim's
winnings in a lawsuit or settlement against the responsible third party or tortfeasor, see
Thomas C. Homburger & Kimberly Harper, Insurance Law Overlay or Title Insurance, in
Title Insurance: Handling Critical Issues Facing Buyers, Sellers and Lenders, at 1201,1218
(PLI Real Estate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. N44607, 1997), available
in Westlaw, PLI-Real database, and a tortfeasor's right to contribution against another
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task of this Part is to delineate the scope of legal sub:rogation, and,
more particularly, to demonstrate how governments claiming ex-
panded preventative and ameliorative costs fall within this restitution-
ary claim.
It is often maintained that legal subrogation is a remedy that
seeks to rectify unjust enrichment. 117 This rationale, unfortunately, is
not helpful:" 8 To say that legal subrogation should be allowed if "it
would be unjust for the person enriched to retain the benefit... is to
analyze the complex in terms of the obscure." 119 Pointing to the prin-
ciple of prevention of unjust enrichment cannot be very helpful since
it does not tell us when the third party's (or the purported subrogor's)
enrichment is "unjust." Not every conferral of a benefit on someone
else-which, by definition, leads to someone's enrichment-triggers
legal subrogation. If the benefactor is considered a "volunteer" whose
conduct is officious, the retention of the benefit is not deemed unjust
and the beneficiary does not have a right to legal subrogation. 20
The scope of legal subrogation, the distinction between payments
that should be deemed unjust enrichment and payments that fall
tortfeasor when the first tortfeasor has already paid money to a victim who is injured by
both, see Stewart A. Estes, The Short Happy Life of Litigation Between Tortfeasors: Con-
tribution, Indemnification and Subrogation After Washington's Tort Reform Acts, 21 Seat-
tle U. L. Rev. 69, 88-89 (1997) (describing right of contribution); see also Restatement of
Restitution § 104 (1937) (discussing right of subrogation for satisfaction of lien).
117 See Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 95-96 (rev. ed. 1989)
(describing subrogation as remedy for unjust enrichment); Burrows, supra note 113, at 82;
John P. Dawson & George E. Palmer, Cases on Restitution 59-60 (2d ed. 1969) (same); 1
Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(4), at 604-05 (2d ed. 1993) (same); Charles Mitchell,
The Law of Subrogation 4, 9 (1994) (same); 1 George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution
§ 1.5(b), at 23-24 (1978 & Supp. 1996) (same); John F. Dolan, A Study of Subrogation
Mostly in Letter of Credit and Other Abstract Obligation Transactions, 64 Mo. L. Rev.
789, 791-92 (1999). But see Horn, supra note 111, at 24 ("It seems to this writer, however,
that the general purpose of subrogation is to facilitate placement of the financial conse-
quences of loss on the party primarily responsible in law for such loss.").
118 For a general critique of the justificatory power of the concept of unjust enrichment,
see Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Pri-
vate Law Theory, 1 Theoretical Inquiries L. 115 (2000) (stating that unjust enrichment is
conclusion in need of supportive normative arguments).
119 Michael Sean Quinn, Subrogation, Restitution, and Indemnity, 74 'rex. L. Rev. 1361,
1367 (1996) (book review).
120 Sheldon has noted:
The doctrine of subrogation is not applied for the mere stranger or volunteer,
who has paid the debt of another, without any assignment or agreement for
subrogation, being under no legal obligation to make the payment, and not
being compelled to do so for the preservation of any rights or property of his
own.
Sheldon, supra note 111, § 240, at 360; see Greenblatt, supra note 113, at 1340 (stating
requirement for subrogation claim that debt being paid not be voluntary); Quinn, supra
note 119, at 1380 ("It is often said that volunteers do not have any rights of subrogation.");
see also, e.g., Fridman, supra note 113, at 401; 1 Palmer, supra note 117, § 1.5(b), at 23.
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under the volunteer rule, must derive from the considerations that
guide our private law-more particularly, the law of restitution-in
cases of the conferral of unsolicited benefits. Legal subrogation, as
one subspecies of restitution for unsolicited benefits, must be shaped
by the same framework.121 This framework provides a principled dis-
tinction between those unsolicited benefits which justify the granting
of this remedy, when we would say that it would be unjust for the
third party (or the subrogor) to retain the benefit, and other unsolic-
ited benefits that are not thus privileged, in which case we will label
the payor volunteer (and the payment officious) and refuse to allow
its legal subrogation claim.
B. Restitution for Unsolicited Benefits
Typical unsolicited benefits (positive externalities) arise where
the parties' interests are "locked in" together.122 The law of restitu-
tion is frequently used to overcome the resulting free-riding difficul-
ties, as long as such intervention will not unduly interfere with the
defendant's liberty or create negative externalities. 123 Examples in-
clude a class action member who pays the lawyer's fee, one of several
tortfeasors who settles with a victim discharging the entire liability,12 4
121 This Article does not discuss issues raised by altruistic interventions by "good samar-
itans." On recovery for good samaritans, see generally Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the
Good Samaritan, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1152 (1999).
122 See Daniel Friedmann & N'li Cohen, Payment of Another's Debt in International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 10, at 42 (1991) ("Broadly speaking, all legal sys-
tems considered in this work contain rules that strengthen the position of the payor who in
order to protect his own interest, pays the debt owed (or also owed) by another."); see
also, e.g., John Dawson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis 36, 138.41 (1951)
(discussing development of protections for those who pay debts of others under various
legal regimes); Sheldon, supra note 111, § 3, at 4-5 (same).
123 Our analysis below triggers legal subrogation. With contractual subrogation (e.g.,
insurance cases), there is no need to examine whether the parties' interests are "locked in"
because they have explicitly agreed to unite their interests, and their agreement is enforce-
able by law. It is only in cases of legal subrogation that courts enforce a duty for which the
parties did not contract; thus, examining the parties' interests becomes necessary to ensure
that one is not getting a free ride at the expense of the other.
A similar analysis applies to what at first might seem to be (and technically is) legal
subrogation. For instance, courts enforce subrogation when a mortgagor pays a mortga-
gee's taxes to prevent foreclosure, even though the parties did not expressly bargain for
that arrangement. Although this technically is an example of legal subrogation, in reality,
it better resembles contractual subrogation because the mortgagor is simply filling in a
"gap" in the contract that the parties would have agreed to at the time of contract forma-
tion, had the issue come to the table. Our analysis also does not extend to cases like these,
which instead are resolved under general contract principles.
124 See 2 Palmer, supra note 117, § 10.6(c), at 410-11 (describing indemnity between
tortfeasors). The case of a joint tortfeasor who settles only its share is more complex. See
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1994) (noting difficulties of such
approach).
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or an insurer who compensates the victim of a tort with its own
funds.125
Restitutionary awards for unsolicited benefits seem easily justi-
fied in such cases if three conditions are satisfied. First, the benefit
involved must be collective with respect to the members of a group,
causing the parties' interests to be locked together.126 Because it is
impossible or infeasible to exclude any of the relevant actors from
benefiting from the other's payment (or performance), free riding
may occur: Individuals may refuse to pay their share, motivated solely
by the expectation that others' efforts will generate the very same
good free of charge (or more cheaply).'2 7 Free riding may frustrate
the possibility of achieving the collective good itself if no single mem-
ber of the group is likely to derive sufficient benefits from that good to
justify paying the entire cost of supplying it alone, and no coalition of
members can feasibly divide the costs among members.12 8 Under
such circumstances, a restitution recovery forces the parties involved
to pay their proportionate share of the collective good, overcoming
the free-rider problems that otherwise might cause the collective ben-
efit to be underproduced.12 9 Restitution of unsolicited benefits will be
awarded, in other words, where it is a necessary form of "mutual coer-
cion"130 for solving a collective action problem.' 3'
The second and third conditions respond to possible legitimate
objections of defendants, even where the parties' interests are locked
125 See 1 Palmer, supra note 117, § 1.5(b), at 23.
126 See John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1418
(1974) (describing unjust enrichment rationale in instances of interlocked interests); see
also Richard J. Arneson, The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92 Ethics 616,
618 (1982) (defining public good by its jointness, nonexcludability, and equal consumption
among group members).
127 See Arneson, supra note 126, at 621 (noting possibility of free riding when exclusion
from benefits is impossible).
128 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 41 (2d ed. 1971) (noting how free riders may deprive collusive organizations from
any benefit of collective action). Free riding also creates distributive difficulties since the
free rider pays less than her proportionate share in the collective endeavor.
129 See Arneson, supra note 126, at 621 (explaining when voluntary acceptance of bene-
fits is sufficient to create obligation to repay).
130 Cf. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1247 (1968)
(explaining idea of agreed upon "mutual coercion" to produce individual responsibility).
131 Free riding is one species of a collective action problem. Collective action is a ge-
neric term describing the difficulty faced by a group of self-interested individuals where the
promotion of their self-interest requires cooperation. Even if they all agree on both their
collective purpose and the best means to promote it, they will still face difficulties in
achieving it, since for each and every one of them the individual interest supersedes their
collective good. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 128, at 2, 8, 10-11, 21, 51, 60-61 (discussing
problems of private individual interests versus collective interests).
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in, that make restitution problematic.132 The first objection revolves
around the difficulties of valuing the benefit received. Where the ben-
efit involved is easily reducible to money, valuation is unproblematic.
Difficulties may arise, however, where noncash benefits are involved,
so that wealth or taste dependencies create significant variations in
people's subjective valuations. As Saul Levmore explains, people's
valuations are idiosyncratic because they depend both on varying abil-
ities to pay for a good and on personal tastes. Levmore gives three
exceptions where the phenomenon of subjective devaluation would
not occur: (1) the recipient has infinite wealth, (2) the recipient is a
profit-making enterprise where subjective preferences have little role,
or (3) the nonbargained benefit is easily translated into wealth. Un-
less those exceptions apply, one cannot easily refute the recipient's
claim that the recipient preferred to invest money in the acquisition of
some other benefit more clearly to the recipient's liking.
133
Where valuations are subjective, restitution may not be appropri-
ate. First, these cases raise the notorious difficulty of interpersonal
comparisons of utility, and thus reduce the confidence that restitution
would maximize utility.13 Furthermore, even where we are relatively
certain that, all in all, the collective benefit is value enhancing, these
are still harder cases since awarding restitution may insult the liberal
commitment to individual free choice.1 5 The concern for individual
132 Indeed the law may (justifiably, in our view) perceive certain objections as illegiti-
mate, and thus ignore them. Where one tortfeasor believes it is worse off by the other's
settlement with the victim due to the information the settling tortfeasor releases to the
victim, for example, no set off of the harm caused by this information to the other
tortfeasor is allowed. Another way to put the same point may be that in such cases, third
party effects justify some leniency respecting the locked-in inquiry. See infra text accom-
panying notes 154-62.
133 See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L Rev. 65, 74-79 (1985) (noting
wealth-dependency problems in valuation); see also Birks, supra note 117, at 109 (discuss-
ing problem of subjective devaluation); Burrows, supra note 113, at 9-11 (stating that bor-
derline of incontrovertible benefits may be open to dispute); Peter Birks, In Defense of
Free Acceptance, in Essays on the Law of Restitution 105, 127 (Andrew Burrows ed.,
1991).
134 Clearly, this is Levmore's concern. See Levmore, supra note 133, at 74-79 (discuss-
ing wealth dependency).
135 See Birks, supra note 117, at 109-10,228 (noting right of individual choice as impor-
tant factor in restitution decisions); 1 Dobbs, supra note 117, § 4.9(2), at 683 (same); Daw-
son, supra note 126, at 1417 (same); John D. McCamus, The Self-Serving Intermeddler and
the Law of Restitution, 16 Osgoode Hall LJ. 515, 520, 575 (1978) (same); Mitchell
Mclnnes, Incontrovertible Benefits in the Supreme Court of Canada: Peel (Regional Mu-
nicipality) v. Canada; Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario, 23 Can. Bus. .J. 122, 123,
128 (1994) (same). Another concern that may make restitution for unsolicited benefits
problematic is negative externalities. Thus, in some cases, allowing restitution to interven-
ing providers hinders well-developed or "thick" markets composed of many active buyers
and sellers. If bypassing the market mechanism would still allow providers of services-
through the availability of restitutionary claims-to receive some prevailing price for their
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freedom is stronger insofar as we believe that the revealed idiosyn-
cratic preferences of the other beneficiaries are genuine, rather than
strategic. 13
6
The case of Board of Directors v. Western National Bank
137 illus-
trates the difficulties of divergent valuations. In that case, apartment
owners in a residential development that combined both single family
homes and apartments protested having to participate in the costs of
maintaining the development's common areas. 138 Although there was
no doubt that this maintenance positively affected the value of the
apartments, the court ruled that the apartment owners were not obli-
gated to contribute.139 The homeowners who conferred an unsolicited
benefit on the apartment owners were deemed pure volunteers. This
result, in our view, stems from the rationale that the apartment own-
ers may have preferred different expenditures from the homeowners.
Because the family homes were likely to be occupied on a relatively
long-term basis by their owners, whereas the apartments were leased
out and for shorter periods, the apartment owners may well have had
"cheaper tastes" even if the maintenance added undisputed value to
the property.
Indeed, in types of cases where problems of subjective valuation
typically arise, restitution is usually awarded only if no beneficiary
who has a disinterested motive for not contributing to the collective
good is required to contribute, and as long as the defendant's propor-
tionate benefit exceeds the cost to him or her of contributing the pro-
portionate share of the costs of supplying the benefit.140 These
services, up-front bids will be discouraged. When some suppliers have the capacity of be-
ing more efficient than others, this would be an unfortunate result. Hence, the law's ten-
dency to deny-in cases where this last condition applies-restitutionary relief to providers
of nonbargained benefits, even if there is no real difficulty from the point of view of the
desirability of such benefit to the recipient, can be seen as "market encouraging." See
Levmore, supra note 133, at 79-80 (explaining market encouragement through denial of
restitution).
136 For an example of strategic idiosyncratic preferences, see Cox v. Wooten Bros.
Farms, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 278 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981). In Cox, Wooten had a subsequent inter-
est in the property and agreed to assume its assignors' obligations on a note to a bank. It
paid off the entire debt-both the part assigned to it and the part which tepresents the pro
rata responsibility of Cox-in order to be able to refinance its operation and obtain an
additional loan from the bank. See id. at 279. As the court noted, it wa'; only at that time
that "Cox decided she was no longer indebted to anyone." Id. at 280. The court appropri-
ately allowed Wooten's subrogation claim. See id. at 281.
137 487 N.E.2d 974 (II. App. Ct. 1985).
138 See id. at 976.
139 See id. at 978-79.
140 See Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions, 76
Cornell L. Rev. 656, 664-65 (1991) (outlining conditions for requiring absent class members
to pay attorneys' fees).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 75:354
SUBROGATION AND INJURIOUS INDUSTRIES
requirements ensure that the beneficiary of the unsolicited benefit
cannot legitimately object to its restitutionary obligation.
The second objection of defendants arises from potential "agency
costs" of the benefactors. In addition to benefiting the locked-in
group, the benefactor may have incentives to act in ways that advance
only its own interests or, at least, in ways that are more committed to
its own interests than to those of its purported beneficiary. 141 A de-
fendant may be rightly concerned that the restitutionary claim par-
tially seeks compensation for benefits conferred only upon the
benefactor agent. In cases that raise such concerns, restitution for un-
solicited benefits may not be forthcoming.
The case of McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Insurance Co. 142 nicely
illustrates this dilemma. In McNeilab, an insured pharmaceutical
company sought restitution from its own liability insurer for a recall
undertaken after product-tampering incidents. 143 Its theory, based on
a celebrated Pennsylvania case,144 was that the recall was expected to
benefit the insurer by preventing third party damages for which the
insurer would be liable. The agency cost problem explains the court's
denial of the claim.145 The court noted that the insured undertook the
recall in the most expensive manner possible and had thus achieved
far more than limiting the insurer's potential liability to tort victims.
Instead, the recall had increased the company's profitability by sub-
stantially promoting goodwill and an image of the firm as committed
to product safety.146 Recall efforts typically involve such moral
hazards due to the intrinsic mixture of collective benefits in the form
141 This "agency costs" objection is conceptually related to our previous locked-in analy-
sis. Where agency costs exist, it usually indicates that the parties' interests are not identi-
cal, so that although they partly converge, there is also a significant divergence. If the
conflicting interests overwhelm the converging interests, imposing subrogation on the par-
ties would actually create inefficient free rider problems because the "benefactors" inter-
ests are then subsidized at the expense of the locked-in group.
142 645 F. Supp. 525 (D.NJ. 1986).
143 See id. at 527-28.
144 Leebov v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 165 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1960).
145 The court's explicit holding relied on its view that recall costs were not covered as
part of the insured's liability policy given that the manufacturer had not actually been held
liable for any of the drug tampering deaths. See McNeilab, 645 F. Supp. at 536. Saul
Levmore has argued that the court's denial of coverage stems from the law's policy to
allow restitution for unsolicited benefits only if the intervention turns out to be ex post
efficient. See Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitution for Best Efforts, 67 S. Cal. L Rev.
1411, 1433-34 (1994). A requirement of ex post success, however, is indefensible. See
Dagan, supra note 121, at 1179-83 (arguing against requirement of ex post success because
it creates disincentive for altruistic interventions).
146 See McNeilab, 645 F. Supp. at 527 (discussing safety measures and consumers' posi-
tive response).
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of liability reduction and goodwill promotion to the insured. 147 In
such situations, where we might have particular reason to believe that
the benefits provided contain such a mixture, restitution should be
strictly limited to the collective aspect of the benefit. In cases where
such a sorting is infeasible, a restitutionary remedy should not be
available.
We now have a principled delineation of the core and the periph-
ery of restitutionary claims following the conferral of unsolicited ben-
efits. At the core, we find cases in which the parties' interests are
locked together and there are no expected differences between their
preferences based on taste, wealth, or conflicts of interest. Where
there may be such differences or where the interaction between their
interests is more equivocal, difficulties arise.
C. The Scope of Subrogation
Consider the garden variety cases of liability insurers who pay an
insured's loss and turn to the tortfeasor for subrogation. Using our
discussion of restitutionary claims for unsolicited benefits, it is easy to
see why this is a core subrogation case.148 The interests of the insurer
and the tortfeasor are locked together. If the insurer's coverage
would have been considered "voluntary"-that is, if we would have
concluded that the tortfeasor has not been unjustly enriched-then,
assuming we would not allow victims to recover twice,149 both the
tortfeasors and the insurers would have an incentive to refuse to pay,
since the first who would pay will carry the burden irrespective of
their substantive rights.150 Allowing insurers to seek subrogation from
147 Such moral hazards may help explain the high cost of recall insurance, which the
plaintiff in McNeilab had at one time carried but had decided by the time of the recall was
prohibitively expensive. See id. at 528.
148 See Friedmann & Cohen, supra note 122, at 21 ("[S]ubrogation is used extensively
[in the Anglo-American legal system] in favour of an indemnity insurer who paid a loss
covered by the policy.").
149 As a default rule, allowing victims to recover twice simply results in insurers transfer-
ring their higher costs to insureds in the form of higher premiums. See Horn, supra note
111, at 25:
In the first place subrogation recoveries do enter the rate structure, by serving
as a reduction in incurred losses; hence the insurer is not paid to take the risk
of negligent losses .. but rather the risk of negligent losses less net subroga.
tion recoveries. Regardless of what specific class of insurance or actuarial
technique is in question, the net losses (net of subrogation) will in some way be
used as a basis for the premium structure.
150 A similar reasoning of locked-in interests applies in the context of contribution
claims of a joint tortfeasor who discharges the entire liability by settlement and seeks con-
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tortfeasors removes this incentive. Subrogation, a subspecies of resti-
tution for unsolicited benefits, is the way to solve the collective action
problem of insurers and tortfeasors.
As long as the right of tortfeasors to contest liability and damages
is preserved in the subrogation suit (with the same procedural advan-
tages-e.g., burden of proof-as they had in the original suit),lS' they
have no legitimate reason to complain because this paradigmatic in-
surance case raises neither of the objections of defendants discussed
above. First, no difficulty of wealth or taste dependency arises be-
cause the nonbargained benefit is already in monetary terms and satis-
fies an expense that is nondiscretionary to the tortfeasor.152 Second,
payment by the insurer appears to provide few benefits to the insurer
apart from the collective benefit of satisfying the duty to pay the vic-
tim.15 3 Hence, no systemic concern of conflict of interests justifies a
denial of restitution.
Not all legal subrogation cases are as easy. A typical hard case in
legal subrogation arises where the parties' interests are not as clearly
locked in. In the setting of subrogation, however, award may be justi-
fied even in such peripheral cases if there are third parties affected by
the subrogee's decision whether to provide the benefit. A good exam-
ple comes from the recent Sixth Circuit case In re Air Crash Disas-
tribution. Plaintiffs are much more likely to settle, or to settle on more lenient terms, if
they settle their entire claim (the advantage to plaintiffs, in terms of litigation costs, of such
settlements over partial settlements which leave part of their claim against other defen-
dants pending is obvious).
151 See 2 Palmer, supra note 117, § 10.6(a), at 402-03 (arguing that where one party
settles with third-party victim, tortfeasor should have opportunity to challenge reasonable-
ness of settlement); see also Stephenson v. McClure, 606 SAV.2d 208, 212 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) (involving contribution claims of joint tortfeasor who discharged entire liability by
settlement and thereafter sought contribution).
152 See Dawson, supra note 122, at 141 ("It will be very rarely indeed that a substitution
of the plaintiff for the paid-off creditor can in any way prejudice the debtor. The modem
recognition of assignability of contract rights greatly weakens the objection to involuntary
assignments by means of subrogation."); 1 Dobbs, supra note 117, § 4.9(2), at 685 ("'When
the defendant's choice is limited by law or fact, restitution may not interfere with any
choice he legally or practically has."); Keith Mason & J.W. Carter, Restitution Law in
Australia 48 (1995) (noting that saving of necessary expense is uncontroversial form of
incontrovertible benefit); Mayo Moran, Rethinking Winnipeg Condominium: Restitution,
Economic Loss, and Anticipatory Repairs, 47 U. Toronto LJ. 115, 135 n-54 (1997)
("[S]ubjective devaluation is simply not available when the law stipulates that the benefit is
one which the defendant was required to choose."); see also J. Beatson, The Use and
Abuse of Unjust Enrichment 32-33 (1991) (describing necessary expenditures and mone-
tary benefits as incontrovertible benefits); Birks, supra note 117, at 117 (same); Burrows,
supra note 113, at 11 (same); Goff & Jones, supra note 113, at 22-25 (same); Mclnnes,
supra note 135, at 124, 128 (same).
153 One additional benefit is the goodwill benefit of being recognized as someone with
whom it is easy to do business.
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ter.154 On August 16, 1987, Northwest Flight 255 crashed and killed
156 people. A jury found the airline, Northwest, liable for one hun-
dred percent of injuries and death caused by the crash, and exoner-
ated McDonnell Douglas, the manufacturer of the airplane.
McDonnell Douglas had previously paid considerable amounts of
money to settle certain claims arising out of the incident. After the
verdict, it sought recovery from Northwest under a theory of equitable
subrogation. The court of appeals accepted the theory of recovery. 155
The court noted that "[e]quitable subrogation is especially well-
suited to allow recovery by an innocent settling party from the actual
wrongdoer,'156 as long as it can demonstrate that it was not "a mere
volunteer."'1 57 The volunteer issue here frequently implies the ques-
tion of how closely the payor's and tortfeasor's interests were tied to-
gether. In this case, it would have been possible for McDonnell
Douglas to have protected its own interests without conferring the un-
solicited benefits on Northwest. In response to McDonnell Douglas's
volunteer problem, the court noted that the money McDonnell Doug-
las paid was "in response to the threat of litigation."158 Given Mc-
Donnell Douglas's ultimate lack of liability, this reason, however,
might seem a flimsy basis on which to conclude that McDonnell
Douglas and Northwest were sufficiently bound together to justify a
subrogation recovery.
The result of In re Air Crash Disaster is correct, but for reasons
beyond the relationship between the two parties. The court praised
McDonnell Douglas's "strategy" to "compensate the injured parties
and focus the controversy between Northwest and McDonnell Doug-
las," a strategy which "provided prompt payments for the special
plaintiffs and reduced their legal expenses." Preventing McDonnell
Douglas "from recovering after it has been exonerated," explained
the court, would have deterred "parties harboring any hope of inno-
cence from settling," thus undermining public policy. 159
The court's concern for third-party effects explains why this bor-
derline case is justifiably covered by legal subrogation. Between a
payor and a tortfeasor, cases of payments to victims by nonliable orig-
inal defendants are on the periphery of subrogation. But in the con-
text of nonbargained coverage of harm inflicted by someone else's
154 86 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 1996).
155 See id. at 511-13, 549-50.
156 Id. at 550.
157 Id. at 549-50. Recall that in the context of legal subrogation, "volunteer" stands for
officious and refers to a duty undertaken by a purported subrogee for its own interests.
158 Id. at 550; see also id. at 552 (referring to Restatement of Restitution § 71(2) (1937)).
159 Id. at 552.
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wrong, the law must also consider possible third-party effects. These
effects should allow subrogation claims to succeed especially where
(as in the case at hand) no serious concerns from either subjective
valuation or conflicts of interests arise.
This attention to third parties is also favored in the realm of in-
surance subrogation. Insurance subrogation is available for payments
which are "favored by public policy," even if they are not in perform-
ance of a legal duty.160 Thus, the "volunteer rule" rarely influences
insurance subrogation cases. 161 As long as the nature of the loss is
within the basic scope of the policy coverage, an insurer who pays a
claim should not be treated as a volunteer, even if it acts in the face of
judicial authority suggesting that applicable exclusion would enable it
to deny liability. 62 The reason for this expansion of subrogation
should be clear: If insurers would not have been permitted to "re-
cover by subrogation colorable claims paid, even if, in the end, these
claims were not, strictly speaking, covered," they would have been
more hesitant in accepting claims, whereas "sound social policy"
should encourage them "to err on the side of caution when rejecting
claims."'
1 6 3
The premises guiding legal subrogation thus track our analysis of
restitution for unsolicited benefits, but with a twist: Subrogation
should be allowed even where the parties' interests are not strongly
enough locked in to present a core case if there are substantial con-
cerns for third party effects and as long as there are no significant
concerns regarding subjective devaluation or conflict of interests.
D. The Governments' Subrogation Claim
Having established the theoretical premise for delineating the
borders of legal subrogation, we can now evaluate the governments'
subrogation claim against industries such as the tobacco and gun in-
dustries. The governments' claims are unconventional in three impor-
160 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72,75 (Ct.
App. 1997); see also Continental Ins. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 266 S.E.2d 351, 352 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1981) (stating that good public policy encourages prompt settlement of insureds'
claims).
161 See Quinn, supra note 119, at 1381; see also Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss,
Insurance Law § 3.10(d)(3), at 249 (1988) (stating that volunteer doctrine is not recognized
by many American courts and almost never applied where liability of insurer was open to
dispute); Friedmann & Cohen, supra note 122, at 13-14, 43, 47 (comparing American law,
where concept of volunteer has often been narrowly construed, with English law, which
remains rather strict); cf. Fridman, supra note 113, at 402 (noting that use of subrogation in
Canada is wider than in England).
162 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77.
163 Quinn, supra note 119, at 1380; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 76-77.
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tant respects. First, the payments for which subrogation is sought-
such as the additional health care costs governments have incurred as
a result of smoking-related illnesses-are not based on the payor's
private duty. Second, the claims are not based on direct payments to
the alleged subrogors, but rather on expenditures made in preventing
and ameliorating their harms. Third, parts of the claims refer to costs
which have not yet been incurred by the governments. The alleged
subrogors of the future health care costs are still healthy (indeed,
some are yet to be born). The first two features call into question how
closely the governments' and industries' interests are locked together
and the future-oriented nature of part of these expenditures raises the
objection of agency costs. Should any of these features make legal
subrogation inapplicable?
In this section we answer this question using the analysis devel-
oped in the previous section. First, we ask whether the interests of the
governments and the industries are locked together. Second, we look
at the possible objections of the industry, which did not bargain for
the unsolicited benefits conferred (indirectly) on it. Finally, if we
reach the conclusion that these two tests classify this case as periph-
eral, we inquire into the third party effects of the decision whether to
classify it within legal subrogation.
At first blush, the locked-in investigation seems simple. The
states' health care costs in our case study, preventative and ameliora-
tive, benefit the tobacco industry by limiting the detrimental conse-
quences to citizens, thus diminishing the extent and amount of
potential damages that could be suffered by the industry through the
injured citizens' suits' 64 (which we assume throughout to be legally
valid). The indirectness of the government payments, however, illus-
trates that the locked-in effect is not as strong as it is in more typical
subrogation cases, where the subrogee is legally required to pay. Just
as in In re Air Disaster and in cases of insurers' coverage of uninsured
harms, part of the states' costs were discretionary.1 65
Next, we turn to the legitimate objections of the defendants.
First, it is difficult to think of any complaint arising from subjective
devaluation concerns. The situation of the tobacco and gun industries
164 See City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 644 N.Y.S.2d 919, 924-25 (App. Div.
1996) (stating same claim respecting costs expended by plaintiff as landlord to relieve haz-
ardous conditions resulting from use of lead-based paint in city-owned buildings); see also
Moran, supra note 152, at 135 ("[Tjhere will be a benefit to the defendant where he has
avoided and consequently shifted the cost of performing his duty to another.").
165 While the states must pay for a percentage of Medicaid, see supra text accompanying
note 92, other preventative and ameliorative costs they have incurred, such as the antis-
moking programs undertaken in California and Florida, are discretionary.
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in this respect is analogous to that of tortfeasors in garden variety in-
surance subrogation claims. As long as their right to contest their lia-
bility and the reasonableness of the amount spent by the states is
preserved,166 and provided the states would have borne the burden of
proof on both issues, no legitimate interests of the industry have been
impaired. The nonbargained benefit indirectly conferred on the to-
bacco and gun manufacturers is, from their perspective, already in
monetary terms, and it reduces (we assume) an expense which is not
discretionary to them.167
The second objection, that of agency costs, may be a valid con-
cern regarding that part of the governments' claim that refers to costs
which they have not yet incurred, the third distinguishing characteris-
tic of our triangular paradigm. When a government recovers for costs
to be incurred at some time in the future, it may have significant in-
centives to pursue benefits that would not accrue to the injurious in-
dustry as much as to the government-money free from political
costs. This concern is mitigated by basic principles of legal subroga-
tion, which limits "the subrogee's recovery... to the amount of the
performance [it] actually rendered."'6 The law prohibits recovery in
advance.169 Correspondingly, governments should be limited to a
judgment of liability with actual payments being made periodically
and to the extent of their actual additional (strictly preventative or
ameliorative) costs.1 70
166 See supra note 151; infra note 184 and accompanying text. To recover against the
tobacco industry, the government must show that its preventative and ameliorative meas-
ures actually reduced the industry's liability.
167 See supra text accompanying note 152 (explaining why no taste or wealth dependen-
des exist in typical insurance subrogation cases). Notice that no difficult question of im-
posing an unsolicited benefit arises insofar as the injured citizens are concerned since the
preventative and ameliorative costs sought do not reduce the industry's liability to them
(but rather the harms for which it is liable). For this very reason, the industry cannot raise
any concerns of being doubly liable (as can some debtors in other cases of unrequested
payments of another's debt; see generally Beatson, supra note 152, at 177-205).
16 Saul Litvinoff, Subrogation, 50 La. L Rev. 1143, 1176 (1990); see also United States
v. P/B STCO 213,756 F.2d 364,370 (5th Cir. 1985) (allowing United States to recover only
those costs actually incurred for clean-up of oil spill).
169 See, e.g., Peter D. Maddaugh & John D. McCamus, The Law of Restitution 165
(1990). Although the majority rule prohibits the subrogee any recovery at all until it has
made the entire payment, see, e.g., Shelter Ins. Cos. v. Frohlich, 498 N.W.2d 74,78 (Neb.
1993); Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1983), this rule is impractical
when applied to the states' claims against the tobacco industry because it would be difficult
to determine what constitutes full or partial payment. Therefore, courts should apply the
minority rule and permit the government pro tanto subrogation based on partial payment.
See Quinn, supra note 119, at 1387; see also Keeton & Widiss, supra note 161, § 3.10(b)(1),
at 233-37 (discussing alternative approaches to allocation of payments between subrogor
and subrogee).
170 Discussing rules of recovery for situations where insureds have not been fully paid
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But even if we set aside the concern of agency costs, the govern-
ments' subrogation claim still looks peripheral given the relatively ten-
uous locked-in nature of the governments and industries indicated
above.171 Third-party effects should therefore determine whether to
allow or disallow a claim to recover those costs in legal subrogation.
These effects, more specifically, justify a relatively generous attitude
to legal subrogation.
The significance of such effects has been recently considered in a
similar context in City of New York v. Lead Industries Ass'n. 172 In
that case, New York City sued five major manufacturers of lead-based
paint and their trade association to recover costs expended in inspect-
ing, testing, monitoring, and abating the hazard arising from the use of
the lead paint; in testing children at risk of lead poisoning; and in
treating the victims of such poisoning. 73 The defendants moved for
dismissal of these claims, but the appellate court refused to grant dis-
missal, deciding that these claims set forth viable causes of action.1 74
for an injury, Quinn says that rules vary as to whether the insurer may recover only after
the insured has been fully reimbursed, or for sums already outlaid even if some payments
remain to be made. Quinn claims that insurers should not be reimbursed for amounts not
yet paid to the insured. See Quinn, supra note 119, at 1384-87.
We have been assuming throughout that the government's claims for money spent to
treat those who are actually already sick (past injuries) would take priority over its claims
for ameliorative costs (present injuries), and that both of these would take priority over the
government's claims for preventative costs (future injuries). Periodic claims for actual pay-
ments will also make sure that this priority is not upset.
171 See supra text accompanying note 152.
172 644 N.Y.S.2d 919 (App. Div. 1996).
173 See id. at 921. Under New York statute, the government was required to alleviate
hazards caused by lead pigments the defendants manufactured. See id. at 924-25. The
court specifically noted, however, that a plaintiff seeking restitution need not have been
under a duty to perform but rather took action to protect the public health and safety. See
id. at 923.
174 It is doubtful whether the particular restitutionary cause of action which the court
allowed, indemnity, should have been available. As Andrew Kull noted in criticizing this
opinion, "[t]he required nexus for indemnity is the existence of a joint liability to a third
party [whereas] the paint manufacturers were not.., under any liability to anyone." An-
drew Kull, Regional Digest-U.S.A., 5 Restitution L. Rev. 198, 203 (1997). This is not
merely a matter of legal formalities, since the classification of a claim between indemnity
and subrogation entails substantive differences. Unlike cases of indemnity, where-for
limitation purposes-liability attaches only when the loss is suffered by the party seeking
indemnity, subrogees are held subject to any valid defenses against their subrogors, includ-
ing to the same counting of time for the purposes of the statute of limitations. See
Laycock, supra note 90, at 647. This defense, however, would probably not have been
relevant regarding the city's case had it been brought as a subrogation claim since, in pass-
ing, the court mentions that "individual children suffer injury from continuing exposure to
paint," implying that, unlike the city's direct claim, the inhabitants' suits are not time
barred. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 925. Because the city would substitute for
the direct plaintiffs, the city's subrogation claim would not be dismissed on limitations
grounds.
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In its opinion, the court relied heavily on Section 115 of the Re-
statement of Restitution, which provides that performance of an-
other's duty where there is an immediate necessity "to protect 'public
decency, health or safety"' gives rise to restitution, notwithstanding
the plaintiff's lack of liability.175 "The thrust of the complaint," said
the court, "is that plaintiffs took the immediate action necessary to
protect the health and safety of the residents of their buildings, partic-
ularly children, from the well recognized hazards of lead paint which
had been manufactured and marketed by defendants."17 6 The court
decided that the reasonable costs of the plaintiffs' preventative and
ameliorative measures are recoverable, emphasizing that "the salutary
goals" of the restitutionary remedy-which are "particularly relevant"
for abatement costs-"are furthered when preventative and ameliora-
tive steps to abate the hazards at the earliest opportunity are immedi-
ately taken to limit the disastrous consequences to children that would
ensue from continued exposure to lead paint." 1 "7
City of New York illustrates how the public duty owed to third
parties by governments in responding to harms should be as compel-
ling a ground for subrogation recovery as. the policy in favor of en-
couraging insurers to pay claims to tort victims. The court generously
interpreted the "immediacy" language of Section 115 of the Restate-
ment and did not require short-term emergency to justify the govern-
ment's action. A government may recover as long as the action was
taken to promote public health and welfare.178
We reach the same conclusion with respect to government claims
regarding the preventative and ameliorative costs for our general dis-
cussion of the triangular case under consideration. 179 Even if, in our
In short, we endorse City of New York, although we agree that (1) indemnity is not the
right heading, (2) the limitation question should have been explicitly addressed and re-
solved, and (3) the court should have emphasized the derivative nature of the city's claim.
Regarding those parts of the court's opinion that deviate from these premises, we concur in
Professor KuU's critique.
175 Lead Indus. Ass'n, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (citing Restatement of Restitution Proposed
Final Draft § 115 (1936)).
176 Id. at 924.
177 Id. at 925. For other cases, in the context of asbestos abatement, that adopted (and
at times declined to adopt) a similar approach, see Rendelman, supra note 6, at 910 &
n.305.
178 See United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 371 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding
that obligation to reimburse government arises especially where duty was "necessary to
preserve the public's welfare and safety").
179 The need to hold an industry responsible for the consequences of its tortious conduct
may not be immediately obvious, since government already has a duty, and therefore
needs no incentive, to provide preventative and ameliorative care to injured citizens.
However, failing to make manufacturers internalize the cost of their negligence is ineffi-
cient as well as unjust, and although we assert that the governments do have an interest in
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terminology, the bilateral relationship between the governments and
the industries is set at the periphery of subrogation, the interests of an
untold number of third party beneficiaries' 80 require the availability
of such restitutionary claims. Public authorities should be able to re-
spond in an efficient manner to any threat to the public health or
safety, without worrying that the provision of services would insulate
those who are responsible to these threats from liability and unjustifi-
ably shift the burden of their wrongdoing to the public purse.181
E. Defenses and Limitations
The governments' status as subrogees, according to our analysis,
makes their rights derivative of those of the direct victims, due to and
to the extent of the unsolicited benefits conferred. As such, the subro-
gee's rights can be no greater than the rights of the subrogor.182 Thus,
the industry's original liability to injured citizens caps its exposure to
subrogation. 83 Beyond the industry's original liability, its putative
objection based on subjective devaluation should preclude recovery.
The governments are also subject to whatever defenses the industry
would have had against the injured citizens, 184 most prominently as-
providing these services, preventative and ameliorative care for citizens is still to some
extent discretionary, such that concern about the adequacy of resources is legitimate.
180 Lead Indus. Ass'n, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 925 (referring to interests of "untold number of
children").
181 See id. at 925; see also Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. U.S., 389 U.S. 191, 205 (1967). In
Wyandotte, the federal government removed a sunken barge and its cargo and brought suit
against the parties responsible for the allegedly negligent sinking for reimbursement of the
costs of removal. See id. at 193. The Supreme Court allowed recovery, holding that the
government's exercise of its right of removal "should not relieve negligent parties of the
responsibility for removal," and adding that any other result would penalize the govern-
ment "for the correct performance of its duty." Id. at 205.
182 See John Dwight Ingram, Priority Between Insurer and Insured in Subrogation Re-
coveries, 3 Conn. Ins. L.J. 105, 107 (1996) (exploring options to reduce dispute about allo-
cation of subrogation recoveries). The pay-as-you-go nature of subrogation obviates
arguments about whether the states have, on the whole, actually saved money through the
early deaths of smoking citizens. For conflicting views respecting the net benefit argument,
compare Willard G. Manning et al., The Costs of Poor Health Habits 27-28 (1991) (claim-
ing that society saves money overall from smokers' deaths), and David A. Hyman, Tobacco
Litigation's Third-Wave: Has Justice Gone Up in Smoke?, 2 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 34,
38 (1998) (same), with Hanson & Logue, supra note 4, at 1247-60 (rejecting argument both
in economic and normative terms).
183 See Quinn, supra note 119, at 1374.
184 One criticism leveled against the idea of allowing individual citizen plaintiffs to re-
cover from the government in this manner is that this may indirectly create a new cause of
action in which plaintiffs' burden of proving causation is diminished: Plaintiffs would no
longer need to establish specific damages resulting from the specific negligent acts of spe-
cific defendants. However, we do not believe that this constitutes an end run around cau-
sation. Tort law has already adopted mechanisms such as burden shifting, market share
and enterprise liability, and alternative tort liability to force tortfeasors to internalize the
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sumption of risk, causation, and statutes of limitations.18 Moreover,
as per the concern from agency costs, governments are entitled only to
the damages attributable to the loss which they have covered 196 (and
they carry the burden of proving that these costs were indeed incurred
in a way that benefits the injured citizens). Governments are not enti-
tled to damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages, or statutory
penalties to which the injured citizens might have been entitled from
the industries.'8
A further problem arises where the resources of alleged
tortfeasors are limited. If the subrogor and the subrogee cannot both
recover in full, the subrogor-the injured party-takes first.?68 This
points to a potential competition between the governments who seek
to recover their ameliorative and preventative costs and the citizens
who seek remedy for their direct harms. This aspect of the triangular
relation between governments, citizens, and injurious industries is the
focus of Part III.189
costs of negligence in cases where liability would otherwise be very dificult to prove. See,
e.g., Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Uncertainty. Making Evidential Damage Ac-
tionable, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891, 1895-96 (1997) (citing ways that tort law deals wth
defendants who cause factual ambiguity to plaintiffs' cases against them, making them
more difficult to prove, and ultimately advocating creation of separate tort of "evidential
damage"). These mechanisms help plaintiffs where proving their cases against particular
defendants is difficult because "the [negligent] conduct of multiple defendants is simultane-
ous but does not combine." Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-
Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 Cal. L Rev. 881, 881 (1982). Had the tobacco
settlement never occurred, for example, it is likely that individual citizen plaintiffs would
have succeeded in this matter and recovered the proportional share of their damages, given
the likelihood that smoking was the cause of their injury.
185 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law § 96(g)(1), at 613 (2d ed.
1996) ("[A]ny defense that the third party has which is good against the subrogor, such as
laches, the statute of limitations, immunity, unclean hands, or illegality, is good against the
subrogee."); Sheldon, supra note 111, § 6, at 8 ("IT]he party for whose benefit the doctrine
of subrogation is exercised can acquire no greater rights than those of the party for whom
he is substituted; if the latter had not a right of recovery, the former can acquire none."
(footnote omitted)); Quinn, supra note 119, at 1363 (same); Greenblatt, supra note 113, at
1346 (same). Recall that subrogees are held subject to the same counting of time for the
purposes of the statute of limitations as their subrogors. See supra note 174.
186 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
187 If the government covered losses from pain and suffering, it would be entitled to
subrogation. See Quinn, supra note 119, at 1375, 1376 n.51.
188 See Greenblatt, supra note 113, at 1346,1351. This issue may be particularly relevant
regarding government suits against gun manufacturers, whose resources available to pay a
judgment are a fraction of those of the tobacco industry. See David E. Rosenbaum, Ech-
oes of Tobacco Suit in Gun Battle, N.Y. Tunes, Mar. 21, 1999, at A32 (noting that annual
sales of gun makers in United States are S1.5 billion compared to $45 billion of cigarette
companies); see also Fox Butterfield, Lawsuits Lead Gun Maker to File for Bankruptcy,
N.Y. Times, June 24, 1999, at A14 (discussing bankruptcy filngs as response to municipal
suits).
189 In other words, we do not think that a defendant in a subrogation suit has standing to
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F. A Note on Statutory Interventions
Having defined the possible liability of industries such as the to-
bacco or gun manufacturers to governments under a common law
cause of action in subrogation, we must also consider the possible im-
pact of specific statutory interventions. Statutory interventions raise
complex questions that cannot be addressed adequately here. This
section is only a roadmap to the way in which these general questions
manifest in our triangular paradigm.
There are two types of statutory intervention that may affect a
government common law cause of action in subrogation against an
injurious industry. 190 The first involves a statutory subrogation provi-
sion whose scope does not coincide with the scope we ascribed to
common law subrogation. In several states, legislatures have passed
statutes that allow the relevant state government to proceed with a
subrogation free of one or more of the industries' traditional de-
fenses,19' or at least to create a lien in favor of the government.192
The second type involves a more aggressive mode of state government
intervention against municipal actors. Several states have recently en-
acted statutes that prohibited (with the threat of criminal sanctions)
city officials from pursuing any municipal claim against the gun
industry.1
93
These statutory interventions raise a host of difficult questions.
The first type of intervention raises the complicated issue of the rela-
tionship between statutory rules and pre-existing common law:
whether the new statute should be read as a clean slate that erases any
raise the claim that it is not liable to the subrogee since-given its limited resources-the
subrogor must take precedence. It can admit liability and ask the court to instruct it as to
whom it should pay. This, however, brings us back to the competition between govern-
ments and citizens, which is the subject of Part III.
190 This question should be distinguished from the problem of a court's determining
when a statutory cause of action should be read to allow contribution among violating
parties. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 288, 293-94 (1993)
(allowing contribution in lOb-5 case and discussing precedents under other statutes).
191 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 409.910 (West Supp. 2000) (abrogating affirmative defenses,
common law causation and damages, and creating special class action rules); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 118E, § 22 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (creating independent cause of action
against tobacco manufacturers); see also Elizabeth A. Frohlich, Note, Statutes Aiding
States' Recovery of Medicaid Costs from Tobacco Companies: A Better Strategy for Re-
dressing an Identifiable Harm?, 21 Am. J.L. & Med. 445 (1995) (discussing statutory provi-
sions). On the defenses relevant to a subrogation action, see supra Part II.E.
192 See Iowa Code Ann. § 249A.6 (West Supp. 1999) (creating lien in favor of govern-
ment regarding claims of state assistance recipients); Md. Code. Ann., Health-Gen. I § 15-
120 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (same).
193 See Bush Signs Bill Banning Anti-Gun Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1999, at All.
With the signing of the bill by Governor and presidential candidate George W. Bush, 14
states have passed legislation banning suits. See id.
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prior common law rules, if the language of the text seems to suggest
so;194 or whether it should be read with these rules at the background,
trying to accommodate its content to a "chain novel" understanding of
legal evolution.195 Courts have interpreted these interventions into
the common law variously,196 and given the jurisprudential stakes, we
do not try to resolve this general question. Still, whatever one's views,
we believe that a statutory enactment that changes the common law
rules in favor of the state should be interpreted narrowly, presuming
no preemption, particularly when the amended rules go to the heart of
the premises of subrogation.
The second type of intervention-where states try to bar cities'
subrogation claims-raises questions as to whether such statutes run
afoul of the state's particular home rule view. Depending on whether
a municipality's suit is styled as a "local" or "statewide" matter, views
would vary as to whether municipalities are empowered to undertake
such litigation in the first place.197 Assuming that the municipality's
suit would otherwise have been permissible, its immunity from the
state's statutory intervention would turn on whether the state had a
home rule provision in its constitution. Given such a provision, the
question of how "local" the initiative is arises again,19s with some
states' constitutions protecting the municipality from preemption only
regarding "local" initiatives,199 and others protecting the local govern-
194 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 24 (1997) ("Words do have a limited
range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range is permissible2"); cf.
State ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.V.2d 401, 40405 (Iowa 1998) (holding that
statute granting lien in favor of state was Iowa's exclusive remedy because there had been
no right to recover Medicaid costs from third parties at common law).
195 See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 313,338 (1986) ("[The judge should] treat Con-
gress as an author earlier than himself in the chain of law... and he will see his own role as
fundamentally the creative one of a partner continuing to develop, in what he believes is
the best way, the statutory scheme Congress began... [H]is account must justify the story
as a whole, not just its ending.").
196 See, e.g., James J. White, Rights of Subrogation in Letters of Credit Transactions, 41
St. Louis U. L.I. 47, 54 (1996) (discussing equitable right to subrogation recognized by
courts in bankruptcy cases apart from statutory right specified in Bankruptcy Code).
197 Compare Ga. onst. art. III, § 6, 1 4(a) (allowing initiative only over local affairs),
with National League of Cities, Model Constitutional Provisions 19, cited and discussed in
Kenneth Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NLC)
Model, 17 Win. & Mary L Rev. 1, 6 (1975) (allowing initiatives over all matters on which
state could have legislated).
198 See generally Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home
Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 Minn. L Rev. 643,650-51 (1964) (arguing that meaning of
"local" for purposes of understanding municipality's power of initiative may be different
than for purposes of determining when state statute preempts local rule).
199 Compare State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 845 P.2d 150, 155 (N.M. 1992) ("A home-
rule city's ordinance will supersede a conflicting state statute on the same subject matter in
areas of strictly local concern. Conversely, a state statute will supersede a conflicting mu-
nicipal charter or ordinance on a matter of [exclusively] statewide concern." (quoting 2
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ment more broadly.2°°
In any event, absent statutory intervention of one of these types,
we believe that subrogation should be a viable cause of action for gov-
ernments that have spent public funds on the prevention or ameliora-
tion of citizens' injuries caused by a defendant industry. Subrogation
supplies the proper doctrinal home for these claims as it is tailored to
address cases in which the law needs to facilitate legitimate unsolicited
conferrals of benefits. The traditional defenses and limitations of sub-
rogation help overcome any possible complaint of the industry from
subjective devaluation or conflicts of interest. The significant third
party effects in our triangular case justify our generous approach re-
specting the scope of subrogation, namely our assertion that these
government claims should be upheld notwithstanding the attenuated
degree to which the government's and the industry's interests are
locked in together.20'
Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 4.80, at 175 (3d ed. 1988)), with
Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 (providing that home-rule authority may supersede conflicting
law of state within city's territorial limits).
200 The second type of statute may also raise democratic and institutional competence
concerns. If governments have brought suits as a way around instances of capture by
strong industries, the subsequent prohibition of such suits by legislation-probably lobbied
for by the industries or their supporters, see James Dao & Don Van Natta Jr., N.R.A. Is
Using Adversity to Its Advantage, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1999, at A10 (stating that National
Rifle Association's lobbying for litigation bars was "its major effort of the past year")-
may defeat the possibility of allowing courts to serve as a forum for a more democratic
discourse. Alternatively, if we are of the view that courts are an inappropriate arena for
such discourse, we might applaud legislation that forbids such "political" litigation. It may
well be that the difficult doctrinal line drawings sketched in the text turn upon these impor-
tant questions.
201 The federal government's suit to recoup medical costs from the tobacco industry is a
particularly rich example of the interplay between statutes and common law in a govern-
ment's assertion of its rights. The bases for the federal claims are the Federal Medical Care
Recovery Act (MCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (1994), the Medicare Secondary Payer
Program of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii) (1994), and the
civil provisions of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Act, 18 U.S.C. 99 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). We are doubtful about the merits of
the first and third causes of action. We disagree between ourselves whether the second can
be the doctrinal home for the federal government's subrogation claim.
Both MCRA and the Medicare Secondary Payer Program are essentially subrogation
statutes. MCRA authorizes the federal government to recoup medical costs paid by the
federal government that resulted from a tortious injury to a covered person. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2651(a). (The United States is alleging that the tobacco industry is liable to smokers for
fraud, negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking, civil conspiracy, and state con-
sumer protection violations. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 49-62, United States v. Philip
Morris, Inc. (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1999) (No. 99-213).) The claim under MCRA is not strictly
subrogation, for the Act creates an independent right of recovery on the part of the federal
government. See, e.g., United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21, 26 (3d Cir. 1968). But
under the Act, the United States, like any subrogee, remains subject to all defenses (except
statute of limitations) available against the injured party. See United States v. Studivant,
529 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting rule that state statute of limitations is not binding
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on United States under MCRA); United States v. Theriaque, 674 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.
Mass. 1987) (noting that United States is bound by state law defenses affecting creation of
third person tort liability).
The Medicare Secondary Payer Program allows the federal government to recoup
medical payments that should have been covered by a beneficiary's primary insurer. It too
permits an independent right of action, see Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 844-45 (9th Cir.
1995), but also subjects the government's claim to the same defenses available against the
alleged beneficiary, see Lamb v. Quincy, 636 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding
statute did not abrogate Ohio's collateral source rule).
The problem with MCRA is that it was designed to allow the government to recoup
medical costs for the treatment of military personnel who were injured by tortious conduct.
This is clear from the history of the Act. See S. Rep. No. 87-1945, at 1-4 (1962); see also
United States v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 5 F.3d 204,207 (7th Cir. 1993). Congress en-
acted MCRA following the Supreme Court's refusal in United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301, 311-17 (1947), to create a federal common law right for this type of recovery.
See S. Rep. No. 87-1945, at 1-3. Congress found that, "in the 30 months ending June 30,
1959, an average of $10.5 million was spent annually for hospital and medical care to mili-
tary personnel as the result of accidents involving privately owned motor vehicles." Id. at
4.
The language of MCRA itself supports the conclusion that it is limited to costs of
treatment for military personnel References to military personnel permeate the Act. For
example, in describing the third-party beneficiary status of the United States, the Act
reads:
If, pursuant to the laws of a State that are applicable in a case of a member of
the uniformed services who is injured or contracts a disease as a result of tor-
tious conduct of a third person, there is in effect for such a case ... a system of
compensation or reimbursement for expenses of hospital, medical, surgical, or
dental care and treatment or for lost pay pursuant to a policy of insurance ...
the United States shall be deemed to be a third-party beneficiary of such a
policy ....
42 U.S.C. § 2651(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1997) (emphasis added).
The language of the Act almost uniformly describes it exclusively in terms of its appli-
cation to servicepeople (although it is clear from the case law that the United States may
also recover on behalf of family members of military personnel, see, e.g., Thomas v.
Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1984) (sustaining cause of action on behalf of ser-
viceperson's son)). The first paragraph of the Act reads:
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required by law to
furnish or pay for... medical... care and treatment... to a person who is
injured or suffers a disease... under circumstances creating a tort liability
upon some third person (other than or in addition to the United States and
except employers of seamen treated under the provisions of section 249 of this
title) to pay damages therefor, the United States shall have a right to re-
cover... from said third person, or that person's insurer, the reasonable value
of the care and treatment so furnished ....
42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (Supp. 11 1997).
Sections 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) and (c) then clarify that these provisions apply to "mem-
ber[s] of the uniformed services." The Act also delineates cases where tortious third par-
ties should also be liable for the lost wages of injured persons in a manner that refers only
to military personne:
If a member of the uniformed services is injured, or contracts a disease, under
circumstances creating a tort liability upon a third person ... for damages for
such injury or disease and the member is unable to perform the member's reg-
ular military duties as a result of the injury or disease, the United States shall
have a right (independent of the rights of the member) to recover from the
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third person... the amount equal to the total amount of the pay that accrues
and is to accrue to the member for the period for which the member is unable
to perform such duties as a result of the injury or disease and is not assigned to
perform other military duties."
42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (Supp. III 1997).
Finally, it is clear that the Act was intended to apply only to servicepeople also be-
cause the Act describes the procedure by which any money recovered by the United States
under the Act is to be credited to the appropriate military medical treatment facility, "as
determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2651(f)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
Furthermore, even if the federal courts' interpretation of MCRA has broadened its
coverage, see, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Perry, 102 F.3d 144, 146 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding for first time that no-fault carriers can be substituted for actual tortfeasor), ex-
panded recovery has never meant recovery for expenses associated with persons other than
military personnel and their families. Cf United States v. Wall, 670 F.2d 469,470 (4th Cir.
1982) (supporting claim that Act is designed for servicepeople).
The Medicare Secondary Payer Program allows the United States to recover Medicare
payments from third parties who are required or responsible to pay for medical costs.
Congress enacted these provisions to give the United States a right, as a secondary insurer,
to demand reimbursement from primary insurers who have a duty to pay for medical treat-
ment. "The Medicare Secondary Payer Program is intended to help the Medicare Program
identify situations where another health care plan should be, or should have been, the
primary payer for a beneficiary's health services." H.R. Rep. No. 104-87(I), at 4 (1995);
see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc. v. Shalala, 995 F.2d 70, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1993)
(stating that purpose of program is to prevent group health plans from providing that plan
will be secondary payer if Medicare coverage exists). The legislative history also notes that
Medicare is a secondary insurer with respect to employer group health plans, as well as
"workers' compensation, automobile, no-fault, and liability insurance." H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 101-386, at 818 (1989).
The Medicare Secondary Payer Program itself provides that it is directed towards
"group health plan[s]," and that "[a] large group health plan... may not take into account
that an active individual .. is entitled to benefits under this subchapter under Section
426(b) of this title [Medicare]." 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i). In other words, the
Program seeks to prevent primary insurers from refusing to pay medical expenses because
those who are insured under their plans are also eligible for Medicare. 'le government is
so committed to pursuing this goal in fact, that it also prohibits employers from offering
financial incentives to keep employees out of a group health plan. "It is unlawful for an
employer or other entity to offer any financial or other incentive for an individual entitled
to benefits under this subchapter not to enroll (or to terminate enrollment) under... a
primary plan. .. ." Id. § 1395y(b)(3)(C).
Do these provisions give the United States a right to demand recovery from anyone
other than a primary insurer? Do they apply to subrogation claims against injurious indus-
tries, such as the tobacco companies? Only with some interpretive effort. Subsection (iii)
states that the federal government's right of subrogation is limited to "item[s] or service[s]
[provided for] under a primary plan." Id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii). On the other hand, sub-
section (ii) says that the United States "may join or intervene in any action related to the
events that gave rise to [a] need for [an] item or service." Id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).
Although it is reasonably clear from the language of the subsection taken as a whole that
this authorization applies only "with respect to such item or service .. under a primary
plan," id., the language of that subsection is less clear. The federal government's best hope
is here.
The government also seeks recovery under the federal RICO statute, claiming that the
tobacco industry deceived consumers about the health effects of its products, conspired to
suppress the development of a safer cigarette, and deliberately marketed its products to
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 75:354
SUBROGATION AND INJURIOUS INDUSTRIES
children in violation of federal law. The RICO statute is not a subrogation statute, and
appellate courts have already uniformly held that third-party health care providers have no
standing to sue directly under RICO. See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that third party had no standing to
sue under RICO); Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957,963-64 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420
Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999) (same).
The circuit courts derive their standing principles for RICO claims from Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992), in which the Supreme Court held
that the standing analyses for antitrust and RICO claims are drawn from the common-law
principles of proximate cause and remoteness of injury. See id. at 268-69. As the Third
Circuit noted:
By subsuming the proximate cause requirement under the concept of standing,
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a private plaintiff might validly
plead (and even prove) that a defendant has committed an antitrust violation,
but still lack standing to enjoin or remedy this violation if his own injury is too
remotely connected to it.
Steamjitters Local Union, 171 F.3d at 921.
The circuit courts have denied standing to sue health care insurers under the federal
RICO statute based on three Holmes principles:
(1) the more indirect the injury, "the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the
amount of a plaintiff's damages attributable to [defendant's wrongdoing] ... ;"
(2) allowing recovery by indirectly injured parties would require complicated
rules for apportioning damages; and (3) direct victims could generally be
counted on to vindicate the policies underlying the relevant law.
Id. at 932 (alteration in original) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70). First, injury is too
indirect when plaintiffs suffer a loss because of the harm that the defendants brought upon
a third party. See id. Because the funds are only "injured" by virtue of the injury to
individual smokers, they are too remote to satisfy the proximate cause standing analysis.
See id. Second, the damage apportionment calculus required to distribute damages be-
tween smokers and health care funds was overly complicated, and no relevant or workable
standards existed to provide a framework for establishing such a system. See id. at 933.
Finally, smokers are capable of vindicating these claims without the tenuous claims of
health care providers. See id.
The arguments used against the RICO standing of health care providers apply with
equal force to the federal government. Just as insurers are harmed only by virtue of injury
to smokers, the federal government sustains injury only on this basis. The same damage
apportionment calculus between smokers and health care providers that the courts deem
to be prohibitively complicated is applied when the United States becomes a plaintiff. Fi-
nally, if smokers are deemed capable to litigate RICO policies over general funds, there is
no reason to allow the federal government to litigate these claims as well.
We agree on this doctrinal analysis, but--corresponding to our more general disagree-
ment regarding statutory interpretation-we draw different conclusions as to the viability
of the federal government's second cause of action. Dagan believes it may well be viable;
White is doubtful.
Dagan believes that judges interpreting statutes should see themselves as partners to
Congress "continuing to develop, in what [they] believe is the best way, the statutory
scheme Congress began." Dworkin, supra note 195, at 313. Therefore, every effort should
be made in order to find a doctrinal home for the important subrogation claim delineated
in this Part in triangular cases where the federal government is involved. This can be done
in one of two ways. One way is to build on the ambiguity we have found in
§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) in order to interpret the Medicare Secondary Payer Program broadly,
as directed not only against primary insurers, but also against injurious industries. An
alternative-probably more secure way-is to find a cause of action by analogy to the
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III
CrIZENS vs. GovERNMENTs: TAKINGS
When two parties to a three party transaction negotiate a settle-
ment, there is always a temptation to take assets from and pass costs
on to the absent third party. In our triangle, the government's temp-
tation to eat the citizens' lunch may be irresistible. Such externalities
may occur when government settlements with defendant industries in-
clude provisions limiting the settling defendants' future tort liability to
private litigants. In the tobacco context, the McCain bill would have
explicitly capped injured smokers' compensatory claims and barred
punitive damages awards and class actions.2°2 Similar limitations may
be reintroduced once the tobacco industry returns to Congress.
203
Citizens thus help pay for the governments' winnings through reduced
opportunities to pursue their private claims against the injurious
industries.
Indirect evidence for the same phenomenon is the receipt by a
government of funds in excess of spent costs and their spending of
such funds on causes that have nothing to do with the injured citizens'
interests. To be sure, some general purpose expenses may set off past
preventative and ameliorative costs that were unjustifiably borne by
the public. But insofar as these states' expenditures exceed those past
costs (with the remainder not preserved by the governments for the
benefit of future injured citizens), they may point out the fact that
even with no explicit sacrifice of the injured smokers' interests, the
states received-and are now spending-money in excess of what
they deserve as subrogees. This fact seems especially problematic
given that subrogation law explicitly gives priority to subrogors' inter-
ests over those of subrogees where the resources of the alleged
tortfeasor are limited. 2°4
Do injured citizens have any legal remedy if these concerns turn
out to be true? Can they invoke the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
Program. Such analogy is required because judges must develop federal law for the better.
In our context this means that they must follow the logic of subrogation underlying the
Medicare Secondary Payer Program, and find the distinction between primary insurers and
injurious industries unprincipled, and thus irrelevant.
White disagrees. He disapproves of this method of statutory interpretation, favoring a
more textualist and intentionalist interpretive approach. Thus, he insists that we should
not make such strenuous efforts to find a doctrinal home for a federal subrogation claim.
Either one exists in the federal common law (but the Justice Department lawyers seem to
think otherwise), or the federal government can go to Congress to get a statute to permit
subrogation. New rights, in his view, should be created by the legislatures. Thus, White is
not optimistic about the federal government's prospects of success.
202 See supra text accompanying note 65.
203 See supra text accompanying note 104.
204 See supra text accompanying note 181.
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ments against a legislative attempt to cap their claims against an inju-
rious industry or to preclude them from filing class actions? Is the
government's receipt and use of industry payments in excess of its pre-
ventative and ameliorative costs tantamount to the taking of the in-
jured citizens' property? These questions are complicated and require
an inquiry into both the underlying foundations of takings law and the
question of people's entitlement to various components of the reme-
dial and procedural aspects of our tort law.
In order to simplify discussion, we focus on the government's in-
terference with expected monetary awards (via its receipt of more
money than it has spent on preventative and ameliorative measures
and/or the enactment of caps). The takings question regarding a trian-
gular paradigm analogous to ours-where the government's settle-
ment with another sovereign limits a citizen's claim against that
sovereign-is unsettled. While the Supreme Court in Dames &
Moore v. Regan205 left open as unripe the question of whether such a
settlement constituted a taking,206 Justice Powell noted in concurrence
that "[t]he Government must pay just compensation when it furthers
the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims
lawfully held by a relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction
of our courts. ''207 Lower courts have followed this proposition by
scrutinizing the constitutionality of such governmental interference.203
By exploring the foundations of takings law, we will show that a
government's interference with its citizens' compensatory claims be-
yond its role as a legitimate subrogee does justify compensation.20 9 In
other words, insofar as the citizen's expected awards are compensa-
tory, and the government spends the money it receives from the in-
dustry on programs that do not benefit the injured citizens, the
citizen's takings claim should be successful.210 Governmental interfer-
205 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
206 See id. at 688-89.
207 Id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring).
208 See infra text accompanying notes 226-29 (discussing Belk v. United States, 12 Cl.
C. 732 (1987)); text accompanying notes 243-45 (discussing Shanghai Power Co. v. United
States, 4 CL Ct. 237 (1983)); text accompanying note 247 (discussing precedents establish-
ing that claim is property right).
29 For an opposite conclusion using the same cases we use but not our theoretical analy-
sis, see Maria Gabriela Bianchini, Comment, The Tobacco Agreement that WVent Up in
Smoke: Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Litiga-
tion, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 703, 735-39 (1999). For an early discussion that agrees with our con-
clusion, see Note, The U.S.-Iran Accords and the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
68 Va. L. Rev. 1537 (1982).
210 Insofar as the preclusion of the pursuit of the citizens' claims against the industry via
class actions reduces significantly their ability to collect their compensatory awards, this
may also be characterized as a taking. Resolving the empirical assumption of this proposi-
tion is beyond the scope of this Article.
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ences with citizens' punitive damages awards present a more complex
case. All we can do here respecting this component of the citizens'
expected awards is to set the parameters for the resolution of this dif-
ficult case.
A. Premises of Takings Law
Takings doctrine is complex and multifaceted; some say cha-
otic.211 If there is some measure of coherence or consensus in this vast
and diverse body of judicial opinions and scholarly commentary, it is
that the purposes of just compensation are essentially two: efficiency
and distributive justice.2 12 Efficiency seeks to make sure that resource
allocation maximizes the size of the social pie. Distributive justice is
concerned with the equitable distribution of the costs and benefits re-
suiting from such resource allocation.
1. Efficiency
The economic analysis of takings law focuses on the incentive ef-
fects of various compensatory regimes on the behavior of the perti-
nent actors. Lawyer-economists discuss, more particularly, the
incentive effect of different compensation rules on the decisions of pri-
vate individuals and of public officials.
When discussing takings doctrine in the land use context, lawyer-
economists point to two conflicting considerations respecting land-
owners' investment decisions. On the one hand, compensation is
needed in order to prevent the underinvestment of risk-averse land-
owners in their property.213 On the other hand, if the law guarantees
the full value of landowners' investments, even where they could have
foreseen the prospect of a loss in value if their land would be sub-
jected to public use, they may inefficiently overinvest.21 4'
The second focus of the economic analysis of takings law, and the
one more pertinent for our current purposes, studies the incentives
that influence the public officials who actually make the crucial tak-
211 See generally Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying
Principles, Part I, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1299 (1989) (describing current state of takings doctrine
as in chaos).
212 See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 998-99 (1999) (defining efficiency and justice in takings
context).
213 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569, 584-99 (1984) (describing effects on land value
when investors consider governmental actions).
214 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Tansitions, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 509, 529 (1986) ("[E]ncouragement resulting from the assurance that compensa-
tion ... will be provided in the event of change results in overinvestment.").
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ings decisions. In this context, it has been suggested that compensa-
tion provides the appropriate incentive for these decisionmakers. 2 15
When the public authority does not need to pay compensation for its
takings, its officials may disregard the costs their decisions impose
upon private resource holders, a phenomenon frequently described as
"fiscal illusion."216 Compensation creates a budgetary effect which
(assuming that democratic mechanisms make public officials account-
able for their budget management) forces governments to internalize
these costs. Compensation is tantamount to a built-in mechanism that
verifies the efficiency of public decisions that affect private property.
This consideration applies especially where the injured parties are
part of the nonorganized public-where they are "occasional individ-
uals"-or members of a marginal group with little political influence.
In these cases, where there is an acute risk that public officials will be
dismissive of private costs, compensation may be the only feasible tool
for mitigation. 217
2. Distributive Justice
It is widely acknowledged that the "Fifth Amendment's guaran-
tee... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole." 218 The question of when fairness
and justice require that a burden should be borne publicly, however, is
much debated. Theories relating takings doctrine to principles of dis-
tributive justice fall into two camps: the libertarian approach and the
progressive approach.
a. The Libertarian Approach. The libertarian conception of
property focuses on shielding the individual from claims of other per-
215 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property 158 (1993) (describing how
losses in transaction are balanced by gains elsewhere); Saul Levmore, Just Compensation
and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L Rev. 285, 306-08 (1990) [hereinafter Levmore, Just Compen-
sation and Just Politics] (discussing how individuals who cannot effectively participate in
political arena are protected by Takings Clause); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special
Interests, 77 Va. L Rev. 1333, 1344-48 (1991) (arguing that compensable taking is found
when government singles out private parties); Marc R. Porier, Takings and Natural
Hazards Policy. Public Choice on the Beachfront, 46 Rutgers L Rev. 243, 260-83 (1993)
(arguing same premise in beachfront context).
216 Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 90 Nw. U. L
Rev. 1561, 1583 (1987).
217 See Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, supra note 215, at 305-19.
218 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For the wide endorsement of
this general proposition, see 'Wtrliam Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, The Nar-
ratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 Win. & Mary L Rev. 1151, 1153-54
(1997).
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sons and from the power of the public authority219 and preserving an
untouchable private sphere, which is a prerequisite to personal devel-
opment and autonomy °20 Private property and the constitutionaliza-
tion of its protection from governmental interference seek, according
to this conception, to decentralize the ownership of resources in order
to diminish the power of governments or any single private entity:
They endow individuals, rather than any collective bureaucracy, with
control over resources and thus preserve personal freedom, security,
and independence.221
For the libertarian, compensation should be required every time a
taking's impact on one owner is disproportionate to the burden (if
any) carried by other beneficiaries of that public use.222 This rule of
proportionality dictates that the claimant not sustain a burden that is
disproportionately heavy in comparison to that sustained by other
beneficiaries of the public action, taking into account the respective
benefit to all parties involved.223 It bars any public actions that would
make some owners worse off by transferring some of their economic
value to the public or to other individuals.224 Assuming that the pub-
lie action is welfare promoting, or at least not welfare impoverishing,
this rule safeguards against any government action that results in pri-
vate owners suffering a net loss of economic value. The proportional-
219 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 71-74 (1977) (ex-
plaining Kantian philosophy as concerned with assuring that no individual is used as means
to satisfaction of another); Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American
Constitutionalism 207-08 (1990) (defining property as tension between individual and col-
lective rights).
220 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 118, 122, 124
(1970) (arguing that man needs minimum areas of personal freedom for minimum develop-
ment); John Rawls, Political Liberalism 298 (1993) (describing property as building block
of personal independence and self-respect).
221 See Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty 139-42, 238 (1998) (detailing benefits
of decentralization of property-related rights); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom
7-21 (1962) (analyzing relationship between economic and political freedom); Bernard H.
Siegan, Property and Freedom: The Constitution, the Courts, and Land-Use Regulation 10
(1997) ("People whose property is not secure from government are extremely limited in
their freedom .. "); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 771 (1964)
("[P]roperty performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and plural-
ism.... ."); Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 907,
914-15 (1993) ("[Property] create[s] a realm of private autonomy in which the citizenry can
operate without fear of public intrusion."). The relationship between private property and
freedom is not, of course, as simple as the text may imply, see Gerald F. Gaus, Property,
Rights, and Freedom, in Property Rights 209 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds., 1994), but further
complications are not required for current purposes.
222 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Do-
main 207 (1985) (arguing that explicit transfers of compensation are required for nonpro-
portionate takings).
M See id. at 205.
224 See id. at 204-09.
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ity rule thereby preserves the prevailing distribution of assets, legal
rules, and wealth (although it may still "translate" people's assets or
other entitlements into wealth without their consent)22 5
In the field of government settlements and extinguished claims,
the case of Belk v. United States - illustrates how such proportionality
precludes takings concerns. In Belk, former hostages of Iran alleged
that the President's settlement with Iran, which had secured their re-
lease, constituted a government taking requiring compensation be-
cause it extinguished their claims against Iran.227 The court rejected
the claim. Although the public incidentally benefited through the res-
olution of a source of conflict between its country and another sover-
eign,2 the plaintiffs (whose freedom was achieved as part of the
bargain) were the chief beneficiaries of the President's action. More-
over, even though the former hostages bore a greater burden for the
governmental action than other American citizens, their benefit was
correspondingly much more substantial 229
b. The Progressive Approach. These theories start with the
premise that ownership is not merely a bundle of rights, but also a
social institution that creates bonds of commitment and responsibility
among owners and others who live, work, or are otherwise affected by
the owner's properties.P0 Furthermore, property is an expression of a
cluster of values-primarily privacy, security, and independence23 1-
225 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PrineYard
v Robins, 64 U. Clii. L. Rev. 21, 27-28 (1997) (explaining how rule maximizes value of
personal use and protection); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lodhner. Modem Takings
Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L Rev. 605, 645, 647 (1996)
(arguing that rule blocks redistribution efforts and inhibits government services).
6 12 CL Ct. 732 (1987).
227 See id. at 732-33 (noting that plaintiffs claimed they would have pursued claims
against Iran for false imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, loss of consortium, and invasion of other rights, immunities, and privileges had
claims not been extinguished).
22 See id. at 734 (stating that all Americans received incidental benefit from President's
actions).
229 For another example, see Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462,1468 (Fed.
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366 (1998) (holding that settling plaintiffs' claims
against government of Iran for full principal but for less than full amount of claimed inter-
est is not compensable taking since result produced by this settlement was "as favorable to
plaintiffs as could reasonably be expected... [as] [p]laintifis have not shown that they
sustained losses that were avoidable under the circumstances").
230 See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L Rev. 741, m-73
(1999) (describing conception of property that views ownership as source of community
responsibility).
231 See Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional Property, in Lib-
erty, Property and the Future of Constitutional Development 127, 149-50,154 (Ellen Fran-
kel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990).
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that always involve the distribution as well as the retention of
wealth.2 32 Property must entail distribution since ownership is a
source of economic, and therefore also social, political, and cultural,
rights and powers; the correlative of which is other people's duties and
liabilities.233
A progressive takings doctrine, committed to social responsibility
and to "the ongoing normative commitment to dispersal of access" 34
must not-contrary to some conventional wisdom235-be too oblivi-
ous to the imposition of disproportionate burdens in the pursuit of
public actions23 6 A relaxed takings doctrine, one that gives compen-
sation only in extreme cases, harms property holders of all sorts, rich
and poor. More precisely, at times (or even typically), a no compensa-
tion regime might lead to systematic exploitation of small and rela-
tively less well-off owners, who by hypothesis have no other way to
protect themselves.9
37
This does not mean that progressives subscribe to the libertarian
rule of proportionality. Strict proportionality would bar any recon-
figuration of the distribution of the aggregate of resources, wealth,
and legal rules.238 Strict proportionality also would undermine social
232 See id. at 150; see also Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Consti-
tutional Idea of Property, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319, 1319 (1987) (stating that private property
is not merely "possessive proprietary principle" or "antiredistributive principle").
233 See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 11-14 (1927)
(arguing that dominion over things is also imperium over fellow human beings); Robert L.
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470,
470-79 (1923) (noting that inequalities in distribution of income and power are direct result
of legal allocation of background rules); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale LJ. 16 (1913) (arguing that
legal rights, privileges, powers, and immunities are jural relations, advantageous to their
holders to extent they are disadvantageous to those subject to their correlatives); see also
Barbara H. Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: Robert Hale and the First
Law and Economics Movement 71-107 (1998) (presenting Hale's attack on theory of natu-
ral property rights).
234 Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beerman, The Social Origins of Property, 6 Can.
J.L. & Jurisprudence 217, 245 (1993).
235 See C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Lib-
erty, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 764-65 (1986) (arguing that protection against exploitation
may not be best guide for property jurisprudence because ban on unjust individual ex-
ploitation would necessarily be so broad that it would also prevent desirable government
actions); Frank Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost Com-
mons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 57, 69 (1997) (arguing that most
regulatory restrictions of land use should be perceived as ordinary examples of background
risks and opportunities against which we take our chances as owners of property).
236 The remainder of this section builds on Dagan, supra note 230.
237 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Tak-
ings and Incentives, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 305, 361, 367 (1997) (stating that, within context of
Endangered Species Act, no compensation rule will not achieve horizontal or vertical eq-
uity within various interest groups and results in unjust distribution of burdens).
238 See Baker, supra note 235, at 748 (stating that rigid formulation of property rules
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responsibility by insisting that our mutual obligations as citizens
should be derived solely from either consent or self-advantage, thus
underplaying the significance of belonging, membership, and
citizenship.239
A takings doctrine attuned to the virtues of social responsibility
and equality must therefore avoid both of these extreme positions.
Instead, it should start with a rule of long-term reciprocity of advan-
tage. This regime prescribes that a public action imposing a dispro-
portionate burden is not a taking as long as two conditions are met:
The immediate burden on the claimant is not extreme, and the claim-
ant stands to enjoy benefits of similar magnitude from other public
actions, even if those benefits are not contemporaneous.2 4 This con-
ception of reciprocity of advantage attempts to recognize, preserve,
and foster the significance of membership and citizenship. At the
same time, it is still sufficiently cautious not to be too utopian about
citizenship, acknowledging the detrimental consequences of a no com-
pensation regime in our nonideal world and, thus, requiring long-term
rough equivalence of burdens and advantages. 241
A further refinement is necessary. More caution is needed where
disproportionate contributions to the community's well-being are re-
quired from owners who are either politically weak or economically
disadvantaged. A government's claim of social responsibility is not
credible if it targets the weaker sectors of society. This concern is es-
pecially warranted when the public action's direct beneficiaries enjoy
significant political or economic power.
242
The leading case of Shanghai Power Co. v. United States2 43 dem-
onstrates this long-term reciprocity test in the context of government
would often have effect of stopping nonexploitive practices); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings. 102
Yale IJ. 1077, 1135 (1993) (critiquing strong antiredistributive view in part because it
seems to invalidate such measures as progressive taxation, rent control, and social security
programs).
239 See Charles Taylor, Atomism, in 2 Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophi-
cal Papers 187, 187-88 (1985) (describing theories of primacy of rights as promoting indi-
vidual rights and assigning less importance to principles of belonging and obligation); see
also Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 171-72 (1974) (claiming that giving each
citizen enforceable claim to some portion of total social product is tantamount to infringing
people's self-ownership).
240 This conception of reciprocity corresponds to Robert Ellickson's influential study of
reciprocal norms in neighborly settings. See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Lavr.
How Neighbors Settle Disputes 56, 234-36, 274-75 (1991).
241 Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 5, 118 (1996) (noting that regime
of strict proportionality defines our obligations as citizens and community members as ex-
changes for monetizable gains).
242 See Radin, supra note 215, at 59 (describing past state actions which benefited land-
lords over poor tenants as in tension with personhood perspective).
243 4 CL Ct. 237 (1983).
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settlements and extinguished claims. In Shanghai Power, an Ameri-
can corporation sought compensation for its lost claim against China
regarding China's confiscation of the company's power plant in
Shanghai. The President had extinguished all outstanding claims
against China in the process of establishing diplomatic relations, and
plaintiff's portion of the settlement, about $20 million, was far less
than the claimed value of $144 million.244 Judge Kozinski concluded
that there was no compensable taking. First, although the plaintiff did
bear a disproportionate loss in the short term, there was no radical
disproportionality. Plaintiff did recover some amount of its losses.
Second, the court noted that the President's ability to establish good
relations with foreign nations was what made foreign trade and travel
for Americans such as the plaintiff possible.245 The plaintiff stood to
benefit as a long-term trader, and thus no compensation was necessary
notwithstanding its short-term disproportionate loss. The case also
did not present any egalitarian concerns as plaintiff was a strong busi-
ness entity able to fend for itself in negotiating with the government.
B. Barring Citizens' Compensatory Awards
We now consider whether efficiency and distributive justice sup-
port the injured citizens' takings claims respecting a government's re-
ceipt and use of injured citizens' compensatory damages in excess of
its preventative and ameliorative costs. We conclude that both effi-
ciency and distributive justice, including the latter's libertarian and
progressive approaches, lead to the very same conclusion: that gov-
ernmental interference with the compensatory awards of injured citi-
zens in the name of the public good cannot be deemed just unless it is
accompanied by compensation.
Courts have consistently followed Justice Powell's theory246 that
compensatory claims with which a government has interfered are
"property interests" for takings purposes.247 Admittedly, as we have
244 See id. at 239.
245 See id. at 244-45.
246 See supra text accompanying note 207.
247 See Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that
plaintiff's expropriation claim against El Salvador was property right for takings purposes);
In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that plaintiffs could have takings claim if Warsaw Convention's limitations on
damages limited their recovery); see also Robert L. Muse, A Public International Law
Critique of the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996), 30 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l. L. & Econ. 207, 207,
229-31 (1996-97) (criticizing Helms-Burton Act, which creates cause of action for Ameri-
cans to sue Cuba for property taken under Castro regime, because it could create massive
takings claims against U.S. government if United States normalized relations with Cuba).
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seen, plaintiffs in such cases have not succeeded in obtaining compen-
sation from the government because the plaintiffs reaped either im-
mediate248 or long-term249 benefits as a result of the governmental
action. In the triangular case under consideration, however, the bene-
fits accruing to the injured citizens through settlements such as the
tobacco case may be too attenuated to satisfy any distributive theory
of takings law. Moreover, allowing governmental interference in the
victim's compensatory claims beyond the governmentt s preventative
and ameliorative costs without compensation is bound to generate
inefficiencies.250
From the standpoint of efficiency, our triangular paradigm
presents a strong example of fiscal illusion. The injured citizens are
typically of the "occasional individual" type, part of the nonorganized
public with no specific political influence. Without a strong constitu-
tional guarantee, their interests may easily be disregarded, and public
officials may use their compensatory damages for more politically visi-
ble purposes. The current proposals for the distribution of the to-
bacco settlement proceeds are a vivid demonstration of this
phenomenon.2 1
From the standpoint of distributive justice, consider first the lib-
ertarian approach. Even advocates of a strict proportionality rule
might acknowledge the need for governmental interference for solv-
ing the collective action difficulties discussed in Part M.5 A propor-
tionality rule would undoubtedly insist, however, that the government
should not be allowed to take any part of the money it has collected
from the injurious industry for purposes other than its preventative
and ameliorative costs. Any amount in excess of these costs should be
distributed among the injured citizens in proportion to their injuries.
Interestingly enough, the progressive long-term reciprocity rule-
the ideological rival of the libertarian proportionality rule-arrives at
the very same conclusion. Long-term reciprocity, as may be recalled,
insists that probable, and not merely theoretical, reciprocity takes
place; the mere fact of the owner's membership in the benefited com-
248 See supra discussion of Belk v. United States at text accompanying notes 226-29.
249 See supra discussion of Shanghai Power Co. v. United States at text accompanying
notes 243-45.
250 Furthermore, in these past failed takings claims, the government typically settled a
claim on behalf of an injured party who later (unsuccessfully) second guessed the amount
of the settlement. Individual tobacco claims present a completely different factual scenario
because in these cases, the state is actually trading a plaintiff's claim to obtain money for
itself.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
252 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State 76 (1993) (stating that social
prisoner's dilemma game can only be overcome through use of collective coercion).
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munity cannot be enough of an advantage to offset a tangible dispro-
portionate loss. The doctrine further safeguards against too extreme a
transient imbalance by disallowing overly excessive private burdens.
In our triangular paradigm, it is hard to see what future probable ben-
efits could offset the very significant harm of injured citizens whose
compensatory awards from the injurious industry are taken by the
government. As we have seen, many of the programs states are plan-ning to undertake with their tobacco settlement funds are unrelated to
the prevention or amelioration of tobacco related injuries.253 The
conclusion that compensation is required seems even stronger in light
of the egalitarian concerns of the long-term reciprocity regime be-
cause the injured citizens in the paradigmatic triangular case are typi-
cally part of the nonorganized public. Hence, a progressive takings
regime would join forces with its libertarian counterpart, concluding
that insofar as a government receives and uses injured citizens' com-
pensatory damages in excess of its own preventative and ameliorative
costs, the injured citizens should have valid takings claims.
Such claims, of course, would arise only to the extent that the
government fails to benefit the injured citizens with settlement funds
beyond the expended costs. Thus, if the funds were held in trust for
use by injured citizens, no taking demanding compensation would
occur.
25 4
C. The Uneasy Case of Punitive Damages
1. The Difficulty
On the face of it, punitive damages are easy. As subrogees, the
states are entitled only to the damages attributable to the loss which
they had covered or will cover s5 and are thus not entitled to the citi-
zens' expected punitive damages.256 Before we reach this easy conclu-
sion, however, a preliminary question must be addressed: Are
punitive damages part of the citizen's entitlement? If the answer to
this question is affirmative, our takings analysis does apply. If the citi-
zen's expected punitive damages award is purely a windfall, however,
then the government's interference cannot be deemed a taking.
Several state supreme courts have recently addressed a similar
253 See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
254 Indeed, we would have no complaint had the government sought through injunctive
remedy the creation of a disgorgement fund that would be available to victorious private
plaintiffs. The Federal Trade Commission is currently attempting this tack in antitrust liti-
gation. See Dick Thornburgh, FTC Seeks Precedent Only a Trial Lawyer Could Love,
Wall St. J., May 10, 1999, at A23.
255 See supra Part II.C.
256 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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question in conjunction with statutory provisions that give states some
significant portion of punitive damage awards.2s7 Those courts are di-
vided as to whether such provisions, which force plaintiffs to hand
over part of their punitive damage awards to the state, effect a taking.
The majority view insists that plaintiffs have no vested property rights
in punitive damages and thus take any punitive awards subject to the
allocation conditions set by the legislature.258 These courts emphasize
that punitive damages are mere windfall to the individual plaintiff, 9
who is the "fortuitous beneficiary... simply because there is no one
else to receive [the punitive damage]." 260
One court has expressed a dissenting view, ruling that a potential
judgment for punitive damages does constitute a property interest.;6
1
This court was careful to emphasize that the punitive damages statute
at issue repudiated any state interest in the litigation or in the judg-
ment itself and that the state's interest attached only after judg-
ment.262 This reasoning suggests that a legislature can avoid takings
claims through more carefully worded legislation. 263
257 Eight states have enacted such legislation. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.73 (West Supp.
2000); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1999); 735 IlL Comp. Stat. Ann. 512-1207 (West
Supp. 1999); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-3-6 (West 1999); Iowa Code Ann. § 66SA.1(2)(b)
(West 1998); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.675 (Supp. 1998); Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.540 (1997); Utah
Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) (1996). One justification for such statutes is that they may amelio-
rate the negative popular image of punitive damages by using the funds to support plain-
tiffs' suits more generally or to promote product safety in some area of law. See Edward L
Rubin, Punitive Damages: Reconceptualizing the Runcible Remedies of Common Law,
1998 Wis. L. Rev. 131, 153-54 (1998) (stating that excess damages could be used to support
plaintiffs' suits or special purpose institutions related to issues of lawsuit).
258 See Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1992) (holding that plaintiff had no
cognizable right to recovery of punitive damages and that legislature may place conditions
on such recovery even to point of abolishment); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d
635, 639 (Ga. 1993) (same); State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632. 634 (Ga. 1993) (upholding
Georgia statute mandating payment to state of portion of punitive damages awards in
product liability actions); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donahue & As-
socs., 473 N.W.2d 612,619 (Iowa 1991) (stating that plaintiff has no vested right in punitive
damages and statutes regulating such damages are generally constitutional). For discussion
of cases, see Matthew J. Klaben, Note, Split-Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the Tak-
ings and Excessive Fines Clauses, 80 Cornell L Rev. 104, 119-24 (1994).
259 See Afack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 638 (stating that purpose of punitive damages statute
at issue was not to provide windfall to plaintiff); Janet Malloy Link, When a Sting Is
Overkill An Argument for the Discharge of Punitive Damages in Bankruptcy, 94 Colum.
L. Rev. 2724, 2739-40 (1994) (presenting how courts generally describe punitive damages
as windfalls for plaintiff).
260 Shepherd Components, 473 N.W.2d at 619.
261 See Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 264 (Colo. 1991) (holding that Colo-
rado statute requiring judgment creditor to pay one-third of exemplary damages award
into state general fund effected unconstitutional taking).
M See id. at 272.
263 See Gerald V. Boston, Punitive Damages in Tort Law § 4:21, at 4-99 to 4-100 (1993)
(explaining that Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Kirk seems to have relied an time
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Determining whether punitive damages are an entitlement based
on the time at which the state's interest attaches to the award is not
helpful for our purposes. Our concern is not whether the legislature
can change doctrines governing remedies, or even liability, across the
board, but rather what are the constitutional limits of governmental
interference with private recoveries of only a particular group of
plaintiffs. 264 Those limits should not be set according to any temporal
distinction. Instead, in order to identify what part, if any, of the ex-
pected punitive damage awards of citizens' claims should be subjected
to our takings analysis, we need to distinguish between the portion, if
any, of the punitive damage award that can be deemed part of the
plaintiff's entitlement 265 based on a "jurisprudence of damages.
'2 66
This section thus undertakes an investigation of the three broad ratio-
nales offered for punitive damages-compensation, deterrence, and
retribution-and explores the implications of each rationale for our
takings inquiry.
2. Punitive Damages for Compensation
Commentators have suggested that punitive damage awards
serve, at least in part, a compensatory function. They allow plaintiffs
to recover "for losses not ordinarily recoverable as compensatory
damages, such as actual losses the plaintiff is unable to prove or for
which the rules of damages do not provide relief, including and most
importantly, the expenses of bringing suit. ' 267 Bridging the gap be-
at which statute attached sharing mechanism to judgment); Paul F. Kirgis, Note, The Con-
stitutionality of State Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 843,
869 (1993) (same).
264 We readily concede that a state could cap damages awards (even compensatory dam-
ages) or could limit the availability of punitive damages to, say, only retributive purposes.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1994), for example, limits the liability
of some nuclear electrical generating facilities in the event of accidents, and its constitu-
tionality was justifiably upheld in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 68 (1978). Rather, we are concerned here with the extent to which the govern-
ment may single out specific groups to limit liability and confiscate the proceeds.
265 See David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Re-
form, 39 Vl. L. Rev. 363, 392-93, 410-11 (1994) (distinguishing between portion of puni-
tive damages that achieves educative, retributive, deterrent, compensatory, and law
enforcement functions, and that which is excess).
266 Aaron B. 'Twerski, Introduction: Punitive Damages: Through the Five Prisms, 39
Vil. L. Rev. 353, 355 (1994).
267 Owen, supra note 265, at 378-79; see also, e.g., 1 Linda L. Schlueter & Kenneth R.
Redder, Punitive Damages § 2.2(B)(1), at 33-35 (3d ed. 1995) (referring to courts' endorse-
ment of compensatory justification for punitive damages). Some reference has also been
made to losses falling on persons other than the victim, but the significance of this consid-
eration is decreasing with the increasing recognition of the independent claims of such
third parties. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Dam-
ages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (1982).
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tween allowed compensation and perfect compensation-fully ac-
counting for the plaintiff's consequential damages, remote damages,
economic losses, exposure to risk, emotional distress, or pain and suf-
fering-appears to have been one of the original inspirations for
awarding punitive damages at common law32"
We concede that the tort system may well be undercompen-
satory,269 and undercompensation, as well as the typical contingency
fee arrangements that frequently give one-third of the recovery to
plaintiff's lawyer, are genuine challenges for a tort system that pur-
ports to compensate fully victims for their losses. However, we be-
lieve that punitive damages are probably a poor mechanism for
bridging this gap.270 First, they are underinclusive with regard to all
plaintiffs in the tort system because punitive damages do not apply to
all cases, and second, they are also overinclusive with regard to plain-
tiffs who do receive punitive damages because, often, their awards are
excessive.271 Therefore, "remedies for missing components of harm
would best be pursued through revision of the rules used to calculate
compensatory damages" rather than by employing punitive damages
to achieve this purpose.2m Viewing punitive damages as compensa-
tory would only exacerbate the already existing irrationality of the
current system by inconsistently correcting these deficiencies, and not
correcting others at al.73 Hence, we assume that punitive damages
do not include any compensatory component, and focus instead on the
two "official" purposes of punitive damages: deterrence and
retribution 274
268 See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60
Law & Contemp. Probs. 73, 80-81 (1997). Other accounts focus on the expressive func-
ions of punitive damages. For more complete historical discussions, see generally 1 Theo-
dore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Measure of Damages §§ 348-352, at 637-93 (9th ed.
1912); Ellis, supra note 267, at 12-20.
269 See generally Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Acci-
dents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv. L Rev. 1785 (1995) (evaluating
nonpecuniary damages on basis of consumer demand).
270 See generally Cooter, supra note 268 (criticizing use of "punitive" to describe gap-
filling damages).
271 See James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from
the Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86 Nw. L Rev. 1130, 1133, 1138-39 (1992).
272 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 939 (1998).
273 See Cooter, supra note 268, at 75-76 (discussing inconsistencies inherent in punitive
damage awards); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 272, at 942 (arguing that punitive damages
should not be used to correct inadequate compensatory damages).
274 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1979) ("Punitive damages are damages,
other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for
his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.").
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3. Punitive Damages for Deterrence
Courts and commentators alike have most frequently considered
deterrence to be the predominant purpose of punitive damages. 2 "
7
On its face, deterrence-the prevention of similar misconduct in the
future-seems to be extrinsic to the relationship between specific
plaintiff and specific defendant, and thus any measure of recovery
based on deterrence must be beyond the entitlement of the plain-
tiff.276 Therefore, there seems to be no difficulty in shifting part of
deterrence-oriented punitive damages to the state.
277
Deterrence, however, is not necessarily extrinsic to the bilateral
private relationship, and, therefore, a measure of recovery that guar-
antees deterrence is not necessarily beyond the plaintiff's entitle-
ment.2 78 A legal regime that effectively deters may well be aimed at
vindicating the resource holder's control over the infringed resource.
This goal makes deterrence part and parcel of the content and mean-
ing of that person's entitlement. In other words, there may be cases in
which we would opt for structuring the entitlement of people around a
model of libertarian rights, a model that discourages potential invad-
ers from circumventing the bargaining process and bypassing the enti-
tlement holder's consent. In cases where deterrence serves as part of
the entitlement to control, it defines the parties' relationship and thus
cannot be deemed extrinsic. It is only when we decide to structure the
entitlement on a utilitarian model, which seeks merely to preserve the
entitlement holders' welfare as embodied in their resources, that a
compensatory damage award that restores the entitlement holder's
objective level of utility is the plaintiff's only legitimate claim.
Insofar as cases of punitive damages are aimed at vindicating the
275 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 265, at 377-78. For the claim that deterrence is ade-
quately secured by incentives provided by the market, government regulation, and com-
pensatory damages, and that punitive damages have no significant deterrent effect, see W.
Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental
and Safety Torts, 87 Geo. LJ. 285 (1998). This proposition is debated. Compare Theodore
Eisenberg, Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages, 87 Geo. LJ. 347 (1998)
(questioning Viscusi's empirical premises about punitive damages, understanding of appli-
cable legal rules, and statistical methodology), and David Luban, A Flawed Case Against
Punitive Damages, 87 Geo. L.J. 359 (1998) (asserting Viscusi's analysis contains at least 13
significant errors), with W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87
Geo. L.J. 381 (1998) (defending original critique of punitive damages by arguing that they
play no constructive role in society and their costs are too high).
276 See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 Yale L. 1489, 1562 (1999); Ernest J. Weinrib, Resti-
tutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 Theoretical Inquiries L. 1 (2000).
277 Cf. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 272, at 923.
278 The argument that follows builds on Hanoch Dagan, Encroachment: Between Pri-
vate and Public, in The Comparative Law of Unjustified Enrichment (David Johnston &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., forthcoming 2000).
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plaintiff's control, we should inquire which specific measure of recov-
ery actually discourages potential invaders from any boundary cross-
ing consistent with this libertarian ideal.279 Usually, the most suitable
measure of recovery would be the defendant's profits. This removal
of the "possibility of profit takes the bite out of the forced transfer,
and apparently deters... the invader" from embarking on a "useless
adventure" at the outset3 ° A profits measure of recovery thus vindi-
cates the plaintiffs' liberty to control the entitlement as part of their
private sphere.281
There are, however, cases in which even such profit-based reme-
dies would not effectively deter interferences and where additional
measures must be undertaken. For example, where the defendant is
the plaintiff's fiduciary, deterrence is compromised by severe difficul-
ties of asymmetric information between the fiduciary and the benefici-
ary. The law vindicates the beneficiary's entitlement to the fiduciary's
loyalty by "reinforcing" the profit remedy with a cluster of rules that
facilitate proof of wrongdoing.m
Likewise, and more pertinent for our purposes, there may be
types of cases in which an injurer has a particularly good chance of
escaping liability for the harm it caused. Where this risk is high
enough, raising significant dangers that deterrence will be diluted, the
appropriate measure of recovery should be increased so that the de-
fendant's average damages will equal its profit. Technically, this
would require that the level of damages imposed should equal the de-
fendant's profits divided by the probability of liability.m This solu-
279 See Nozick, supra note 239, at 57, 71-73.
28o Dagan, supra note 90, at 18; see also Cooter, supra note 268, at 77 ("[A]n injurer who
faces certain liability for extra-disgorging damages prefers not to cause the injury. When
the liability system works perfectly, liability for extra-disgorging damages deters inten-
tional wrongdoing."); Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deter-
rence-Measured Remedies, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 831, 874 (1989) ("ITihe most obvious
measurement for [an extracompensatory] award would be the amount of profit the defen-
dant has earned or will earn from the misconduct."); Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil
Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 Clev. St. L Rev. 1, 12 (1989) ("Deterrence occurs
when a rational person perceives that the risk of liability for his proscribed act, along with
the other costs, exceeds the probable gains.").
281 Whether a profit measure of recovery is efficient is subject to some economic dis-
pute. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87
Geo. LJ. 421, 423 (1998) (suggesting that where defendant's gain is probably less than or
equal to victim's loss, then punitive award should aim to eliminate prospect of gain an part
of offender); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 272, at 918-20, 945-47 (discussing instances in
which policy of removing defendant's gain may result in overdeterrence).
22 See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Eco-
nomic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1045, 1046-47, 1051-54
(1991) (stating that rules accompanying fiduciary duty include shifting balance of proof to
fiduciary or applying conclusive presumption of appropriation).
M See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 272, at 889, 895-96; see also Robert D. Cooter,
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tion seems especially pertinent in the case of citizen suits against
injurious industries: The victim may have difficulty establishing causa-
tion; she might not be able to ascertain which polluter is responsible
for her harms (analogous to smokers who have smoked many brands
of cigarettes); and she might not even bring suit given such expected
problems of proof234
Applying this analysis to our context would require the citizens
who challenge the government interference with their punitive dam-
age awards to convince a court that the awards were indeed aimed at
vindicating their control respecting the entitlement infringed upon by
the injurious industry. Furthermore, they would also need to demon-
strate that the amounts awarded to them are equal (or at least approx-
imate) to the industry's profit, or, in appropriate cases, the profit
divided by the enforcement probability. 285 Given the open-ended,
discretionary authority for juries to award punitive damages, it may
well be very difficult to carry the burden of proof 2 86
4. Punitive Damages for Retribution
Finally, as the term may suggest, punitive damages are sometimes
justified by reference to retribution. 287 There seem to be two basic
Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1143, 1148
(1997) ("[T]he punitive multiple should equal the reciprocal of the enforcement error for
the sake of deterrence .... "); cf. Hylton, supra note 281, at 422-24 (applying Polinsky's and
Shavell's formula only as minimum punitive damages when offender's gain is equal to or
less than victim's loss). Where the likelihood of escaping liability is not especially high, this
refinement is not especially needed for vindicating control, at least where the defendant's
expected gain is greater than the plaintiff's harm. The plaintiff's opportunity to recover
such excess gain creates an appropriate incentive actually to detect infringement, thus fur-
ther diminishing the significance of the defendant's escaping liability.
284 Cf. Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and its
Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2185, 2237 (1999) (discussing multiplier principle as it re-
lates to enforcement); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 272, at 888 (discussing difficulty of
proof as one reason why injurers at times escape liability).
285 It is especially difficult to prove that the damage awards equal this sum because not
all smokers-or their claims-are alike. The spectrum of potential claimants encompasses
those who began smoking during the period of severe underenforcement of laws against
the tobacco industry to those who began smoking relatively recently, when enforcement
has become relatively comprehensive.
286 The difficulty addressed by the text is but one disadvantage of the open-ended na-
ture of punitive damages in contemporary doctrine. See Cass R. Sunstehi et al., Assessing
Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L.J. 2071,
2078-79 (1998) (finding that judges, not juries, should decide amounts of punitive damage
awards).
287 See Boston, supra note 263, § 2:6, at 11 ("[Mjost jurisdictions recognize the dual
objectives of punishing the defendant for its wrongful conduct and deterring the defendant
and others from repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future."); Cooter, supra
note 283, at 1146 ("A consensus among legal scholars holds that detenence, along with
punishment, is the goal of punitive damages."). For skeptical views as to the punishment
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accounts of this retribution idea. They lead to different results re-
specting the plaintiff's entitlement to the punitive damage award.
On one account, the award of punitive damages "serves as a voice
of outrage for the body politic."' It is an opportunity to speak to the
conscience of the country; a part of "the American judicial theatre
[which] plays a role... that has no parallel in any other country"; a
measure of "creative government" which produces "a cathartic ef-
fect."8 9 This understanding of the retribution function of punitive
damages does not even attempt to include a role for the plaintiff in the
retribution drama. Hence, it would tend to perceive the award as a
windfall for the plaintiff2 90 and correspondingly to see the govern-
ment's interference with such a windfall as unproblematic.
This view, however, is not the only available understanding of the
retribution idea of punitive damages. Others believe punitive dam-
ages are "the expression of an intellectual judgment about justice and
desert."291 Against a wrongdoer who "has implicitly asserted a Idnd
of undeserved mastery and superiority over the victim," punitive dam-
ages "reassert the truth about the relative value of wrongdoer and
victim by inflicting a publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer."292 Pu-
nitive damages send a message by inflicting an expressive defeat on
the wrongdoer. "A more heinous act on the part of the wrongdoer
expresses a greater level of contempt for the victim, and so the expres-
sive defeat must be correspondingly more decisive; hence the princi-
ple that greater wickedness deserves greater punishment."' 93
This second understanding of the retribution idea of punitive
damages suggests that the plaintiff-the injured citizen in our triangu-
lar scenario-does have an entitlement in a punitive damage award.
objective, in general and respecting firms, correspondingly, see Ellis, supra note 267, at 4-8;
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 272, at 948-54.
288 Twerski, supra note 266, at 361; see also Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Dam-
ages: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40 Ala. L Rev. 1079, 1110 (1989) ("ITihe
doctrine of punitive damages draws on the preliberal notion of a jury as representing the
collective morality of a community.").
289 Twerski, supra note 266, at 360; see also Owen, supra note 265, at 374-76.
290 See Schlueter & Redder, supra note 267, § 2.2(A)(2), at 32 ("Because the plaintiff
already received full compensation, any additional award is merely an unjustified vindfall
for the plaintiff. Thus, punitive damages are not awarded as matter of right but are within
discretion of the jury and with certain prerequisites.").
291 Luban, supra note 275, at 378.
292 Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Plural-
ism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393,1432 (1993); see also David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations
of Punitive Damages, 40 Ala. L Rev. 705, 711 (1989) ("If autonomy thefts-intentional
'border crossings' into other persons' zones of rights-were not subjected to penalties in
addition to the restoration of the stolen goods (compensatory damages), the rectification
of the transaction would be incomplete." (footnote omitted)).
293 Luban, supra note 275, at 378.
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The wrongdoer's punishment should not be, in this view, "too lenient"
since if it is, it implies that society as a whole "ratifies the view that the
victim is the sort of person it is all right to treat badly. '294 It may be
difficult, however, to measure such an entitlement for purposes of tak-
ings law. Such expressive retribution can hardly produce the kind of
clear calibration of punitive damage that is required in order to deter-
mine whether the government's interference with the award consti-
tutes a taking.295
In sum, the case of barring punitive damages as part of a govern-
ment-industry settlement derives complexity from the unsettled na-
ture of punitive damages. We doubt that citizens can claim any
entitlement for punitive damages for retribution. But insofar as puni-
tive damages are aimed at deterring the defendant's infringement of
the plaintiff's entitlement, thus vindicating the latter's control over the
infringed resource, plaintiffs may well have valid takings claims even
respecting punitive damage. As long as punitive damages for deter-
rence will not be disentangled from punitive damages for retribution,
these claims would probably remain theoretical. On the other hand,
we have no doubt that governmental interference with citizens' com-
pensatory awards should be regarded as a violation of their Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. As this Part has demonstrated, a strict
takings doctrine is the only viable protection for citizens from the dan-




As we demonstrate in Part III, there is considerable risk that gov-
ernmental interference in the resolution of mass tort claims will vio-
late the legal rights of the individual victims. Our case study of the
tobacco settlement highlights an additional disadvantage, that such in-
terference is also bad public policy even where it might not violate the
legal rights of the individual victims. This is true whether one consid-
ers the settlement to be merely an agreed resolution of a tort subroga-
tion claim or a state imposed tax.
294 Galanter & Luban, supra note 292, at 1433.
295 See Cooter, supra note 268, at 74 ("Courts should not ask juries to determine the
extent of punishment without providing instructions for its computation from the facts of
the case."); Owen, supra note 292, at 732-33 (finding that restitution for stolen freedom is
"highly metaphorical, indeterminate, and hence incapable of principled measurement" and
that "[t]here is no good resolution").
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We acknowledge that the states are proper subrogees for their
ameliorative and preventative costs and we see no reason why their
claim for those costs could not be resolved by agreement with the
manufacturers. But the settlement is unlike a garden variety subroga-
tion recovery; as true subrogees, the states would surely not have won
judgments with a value equal to the amount that the tobacco manufac-
turers have agreed to pay.296 The states reached such a favorable set-
tlement only by colluding with the tobacco manufacturers to put a
disproportionate share of the cost on their citizen smokers.
Our principal quarrel with the Settlement as an agreed resolution
of a tort claim is that some of the terms-reducing payments by the
participating manufacturers if they lose market share to outsiders and
inviting the states to enact a tax that deters new market entrants297-
improperly redistribute costs from the tobacco companies' sharehold-
ers to their consumers. 298 If the agreements in the Settlement had
been reached between private parties, they would have violated fed-
eral antitrust laws.299 Although states' agreements are immune from
federal antitrust prosecution, 30 0 the anticompetitive provisions of the
Settlement will have exactly the same effect as if private parties had
conspired to exclude competitors. If the agreement with the manufac-
turers hinders the entry of new competitors, the price of cigarettes will
be higher than in a freely competitive market.
The higher price has two effects. First, it frees the companies'
shareholders from having to internalize the costs of their tort liability;
they can pass on the costs to consumers without a loss in market
share.301 Second, it facilitates the inclusion of additional payments in
the Settlement (e.g., payments for lobbying) without fear that new en-
trants to the market will undercut the cigarette prices of the partici-
296 See supra Part I.C.
297 See supra Part I.C.2.
298 Some might claim that the shareholders could avoid this loss by selling their shares.
Because of the speed with which the market has responded to litigation and other factors
in the cigarette business, it would have taken a particularly adroit shareholder to escape
the loss. In the past two-and-a-half years, Philip Morris's shares have fluctuated between
about $19 and $57. During 1999, Philip Morris's share value declined more than 55% as
more and more threatening clouds appeared.
299 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States ... is declared to be illegal.").
300 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136 (1961) ("[W]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid gov-
ernmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be
made out." (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
301 The manufacturers raised the price of cigarettes in unison about $0.45 per pack in the
fall of 1998. See Vanessa O'Connell, Philip Morris, RIR Lift Wholesale Price for Ciga-
rettes 45 Cents a Pack Today, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1998, at A2.
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pating manufacturers. If demand for cigarettes is relatively inelastic,
if price competition among the participating manufacturers is muted,
and if outsiders are barred, the cost of any "bribe" to the state govern-
ments can be passed through to purchasers without cost to the
manufacturers. 302
The Settlement may be even more offensive to public policy if it
is considered to be a tax imposed by quasi-judicial action. The pay-
ments have many of the attributes of a tax: They are made to the
states; continue indefinitely; are only imperfectly related to past tort
injuries; and in many states will go directly into the treasury and be
expended in just the same way as conventional tax revenues would
be.303 As a tax, the Settlement is undemocratic and regressive.
The first and most powerful objection is that as a tax the Settle-
ment violates the democratic principles that are built into the tax laws
of every state. If a state were to enact a multibillion dollar tax equal
to the revenues that it will receive under the Settlement, it would have
to follow elaborate legislative procedures. Typically, these measures
would include legislative hearings, debate, and passage by both houses
of the state legislature, and signature by the governor.3 04 In contrast,
a state's adoption of the Settlement required only the agreement of a
state official such as the attorney general and the adoption of the set-
tlement in a judgement dismissing the state's suit against the manufac-
turers.305 The Settlement's bypassing of the traditional safety
mechanisms for the passage of new taxes reduces the visibility of the
Settlement's provisions. No advocate for cigarette consumers has
ever had the opportunity to express the arguments that we consider
here. No attorney general has had to respond to questions about the
Settlement's anticompetitive provisions. No antitax governor has had
to explain why he or she is proposing a huge new tax.
This lack of public participation becomes even more troubling
when we consider that in modern America smokers are drawn dispro-
302 Of course, it is true that imposing a high tax on existing manufacturers and erecting
barriers to others' entry could serve a state goal of reducing smoking. Because there are
more principled ways to accomplish that result that are not subject to the criticism elabo-
rated in this Article, we do not believe that the current regime can be justified as a way to
reduce smoking. After all, a legislature might conclude that a larger or smaller tax is ap-
propriate. Since no legislature was asked how large its tax should be, we do not know what
answer it would give in the face of conflicting claims by smokers and nonsmokers.
303 See When Lawyers Inhale, Economist, May 22, 1999, at 88.
304 See, e.g., How a Bill Becomes a Law in Minnesota (visited March 30, 2000) <http://
www.leg.state.mn.us/leg/howbill/htm> (emphasizing that bill must pass both houses of Min-
nesota's legislative branch).
305 "Final approval" of the Settlement requires "State-Specific Finality." Master Settle-
ment Agreement, supra note 76, § II(u). "State-Specific Finality" in turn requires approval
and entry by a court. See id. § II(ss).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 75:354
SUBROGATION AND INJURIOUS INDUSTRIES
portionately from classes with limited education and low incomes. 306
The tobacco manufacturers' ability to pass on the costs of the Settle-
ment means that the costs will be imposed primarily on working-class
smokers. This concern would be alleviated if a disproportionately
large share of the tax revenues were to go to the working class, partic-
ularly to the smokers, but we see no evidence of that happening.
3 7
Consider one final consequence of this unusual tax. Every excise
tax on a potentially injurious product is, of course, a bargain with the
devil, for more sales mean both more tax revenue and more injuries.
But the peculiar nature of this tax ties the states even more closely to
current members of the tobacco industry than would be true of a con-
ventional tax. Because the tax arises from an agreement between
each state and specific tobacco manufacturers, the tax revenues de-
pend upon the continued existence and solvency of the participating
manufacturers. If Philip Morris or RJR goes into bankruptcy and liq-
uidates, and their market share is taken over by a new entrant, every
state's tax revenues will decline accordingly. Each state will thus have
an incentive to keep these particular taxpayers healthy. If our analysis
is correct, the states have made covert, implied promises about lobby-
ing and covert, express promises about erecting barriers to new en-
trants that the states would probably not make to anyone openly,
certainly not to specific members of a particular industry.30s
Because the Settlement revenues go to identifiable beneficiaries
in most states, persons in every state will shortly regard these benefits
as an entitlement. The incentive of state officials to maintain the reve-
nues will be correspondingly enhanced by the knowledge that particu-
lar, local voters depend on this revenue.
We see much that is bad and little that is good from enacting such
a tax by a quasi-judicial process. The absence of the legislature from
306 See Robert D. Tollison & Richard E. Wagner, Smoking and the State 8 (1988) (not-
ing that regressivity of cigarette taxes is strengthened because "the use of tobacco products
declines as income rises").
307 See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
308 If the states had entered into an agreement with the tobacco manufacturers that
required the manufacturers to pay only the proper value of the states' subrogation claims
(taking into account the defenses that could properly be asserted by the tobacco compa-
nies), the states' incentive to lobby for restrictions on their citizens' potential recovery
from the tobacco manufacturers would have been much smaller than it will be under the
existing agreement. First, the states would lose proportionally less (by way of agreed pay-
ments) from any tobacco manufacturer's bankruptcy because the total payments would be
smaller. Second, any state's need for revenue from the sale of cigarettes would be met by a
tax applicable to all sales that would be insensitive to the failure of existing manufacturers.
If one assumes that there is a relatively fixed demand for cigarettes, the bankruptcy of one
or all existing manufacturers would not reduce any state's revenues because other manu-
facturers, including new entrants, could be expected to come into the market to replace
any failed manufacturer.
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the adoption process stills the public's voice and facilitates collusive
bargains. Characterizing the payments as tort recoveries frees public
officials from the pain that they would suffer for enacting new taxes,
particularly regressive ones. Finally, the exclusion of smokers from
the private bargaining table facilitates other parties' taking assets that
should belong to the excluded players.
CONCLUSION
We do not claim that every bargain struck in settlement of a state
or federal suit against weapons manufacturers, sellers of fatty foods,
brewers, or distillers will have all of the same characteristics as the
tobacco settlement. But we believe that when the government asserts
a claim that could be asserted by an individual citizen, it will almost
always be presented with the same temptation to collusion and con-
version. The industry under attack will always want protection from
the private suits; that may be its only hope for survival. Invariably,
therefore, these industries will seek payment out of the resources of
the individual plaintiffs. Because these bargains are negotiations for
the settlement of suits to which, by hypothesis, the individuals are not
parties, the individual plaintiffs will be excluded. But as we demon-
strate in Part II, government interference is also beneficial, for it al-
lows governments to pursue their public responsibilities in preventing
and ameliorating injuries to their citizens without fear that the public
will bear more than its fair share of the cost. Properly asserted, gov-
ernment legal subrogation claims insure the correct internalization of
the true costs of an industry's products.
As we claim throughout, government's legal subrogation claims
are both salutary and dangerous. Only a generous approach to subro-
gation accompanied by a strict takings inquiry can capture the advan-
tages of government involvement without opening the door to abuse.
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